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WE THREE KINGS: DISINTERMEDIATING VOTING AT THE
INDEX FUND GIANTS
CALEB N. GRIFFIN ∗
ABSTRACT
The meteoric rise of passive investing has placed three large index funds—Vanguard, BlackRock, and State Street—in a new and
pivotal role as the arbiters of corporate law controversies and the
framers of market-wide governance standards. This Article will
propose reshaping the approach to investment stewardship at the
Big Three index funds to empower individual index fund investors
and to enable their involvement in the decision-making process.
The involvement of individual investors could take one of three
forms. First, an “indirect democracy” approach would allow individual investors to elect to have the votes corresponding to their
indirect share ownership cast according to the recommendations
of a particular agent. Second, a policy of “informed discretion”
would entail solicitation by index fund providers of more information about the characteristics and values of their investors,
which they would use to better inform their voting decisions.
Third, “pass-through voting instructions” would give individual
investors the opportunity to participate in shareholder voting by
completing a general, issue-based survey about how they desire to
vote on a number of key issues. The uniting feature of all three
approaches is that they would involve individual investors in the
voting process to a greater degree, thereby diminishing the power
of index fund agents, mitigating concerns about the concentrated
power of index funds, and reducing agency costs.
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a fairy tale that goes something like this: Once upon a time, in
the faraway land of Sharetopia, there lived three powerful kings. They acted
as stewards of their citizens’ money (for a small fee of course), and their
control over this money gave them influence over large swaths of the land’s
productive activities. As the power of these kings grew until it dominated the
whole of Sharetopia, the citizens began to wonder whether the kings were
© 2020 Caleb N. Griffin
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ever tempted to use their power in their own self-interest rather than in the
interests of their citizens. When the citizens presented these concerns at an
audience with the kings, the kings declared that it would take far too many
resources to figure out the actual interests of their citizens, even in very general terms. Instead, the three kings promised that they would use their power
in the citizens’ “best interests,” although they reserved the right to define
exactly what that might mean. When the citizens asked whether they might
provide some thoughts about what their own “best interests” were, the kings
politely declined. In any event, the kings noted, the very high barriers to
entry for the position of king meant that, now and for the foreseeable future,
the citizens had few realistic alternatives. The citizens went home pleased to
have such a well-functioning democracy.
As it currently stands, the index fund voting landscape—dominated by
three massive index funds—shares some striking similarities with the satirical Sharetopia. Index fund investors entrust their savings to index fund providers, who retain the power to vote the fund’s proxies. In lieu of a true
democracy where index fund investors would be involved in voting decisions, index fund agents can vote shares representing their investors’ economic stake in a given firm with only very limited constraints: First, index
funds must disclose certain information about their voting policies and the
votes they cast. 1 Second, index funds are required to vote “in a manner consistent with the best interests” of index fund investors. 2
There are some important problems with the “best interests” standard.
The first question begging to be answered is, whose best interests? One hundred percent of investors? Fifty-one percent? Should values and preferences
held by only a minority of investors be accorded any importance at all? A
key problem is that fund investors are human beings, and, as human beings,
they have diverse preferences and values. Currently, funds ignore the diversity of their investors while voting their shares, preferring to identically vote
virtually all the shares they own. 3 Second, even if funds were clear on exactly
whose interests the fund should be representing, and whether such representation should be winner-take-all or proportional, how do index funds discover
1. See generally Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8188, Exchange Act Release
No. 47,304, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,922, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564 (Jan. 31, 2003) (summarizing the rule and form amendments adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission).
2. Id. (“An investment adviser voting proxies on behalf of a fund . . . must do so in a manner
consistent with the best interests of the fund and its shareholders.”).
3. See Jan Fichtner et al., Hidden Power of the Big Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-Concentration of Corporate Ownership, and New Financial Risk, 19 BUS. & POL. 298, 316–17 (2017). But
see VANGUARD, VANGUARD FUNDS PLAN TO GRANT PROXY VOTING RESPONSIBILITIES TO
EXTERNAL MANAGERS (2019), https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/perspectivesand-commentary/proxy_ext_mgrs.pdf (indicating that Vanguard will outsource some proxy voting
to external managers).
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or discern those interests? Currently, they make no serious effort to do so.
Interestingly, this obviates the need for index fund managers to answer the
first question—simply ignoring that diverse preferences exist makes short
work of addressing those preferences. Third, the vagueness of the “best interests” standard, and the lack of any mandate to discover any actual interests
of their shareholders, makes it difficult to hold fund management accountable
for violating the standard, potentially increasing agency costs.4 Beyond a
clear conflict of interest, it seems likely that the “best interests” standard
would be satisfied by virtually any colorable claim to that effect. This means
that, where a plausible argument can be made for supporting either side, fund
managers have near total discretion in their voting decisions, regardless of
whether substantial amounts of their investors disagree and without even attempting to discern whether they disagree. Thus, while the “best interests”
standard is likely to prevent the most serious conflicts of interest, it is little
more than a fiduciary fig leaf when it comes to promoting accountability and
cabining the voting discretion of fund management.
This Article will analyze the implications of index funds’ rise to power
and their increasing dominance over corporate decisionmaking. Part II will
begin with a brief description of the index fund’s rise to power, moving in
Part III to an analysis of their current capacity to influence corporate governance. Part IV will contain a detailed analysis of how index funds’ shares are
currently voted. Part V will examine the changes wrought by index funds’
growing influence and discuss a number of key concerns engendered by their
current scale and voting practices. In Part VI, this Article will analyze the
strengths and weaknesses of several proposed solutions and the reasons why
they fall short. Part VII will propose an alternate approach, which disintermediates index fund voting by involving individual index fund investors in
the process of setting voting priorities. Ultimately, this Article will argue that
this approach could re-democratize shareholder democracy and effectively
reduce the power of the Big Three while obviating the need for more drastic
solutions.
II. THE RISE OF THE INDEX FUND
A. Theoretical Origins of the Index Fund
A group of influential economists laid the foundation for the creation of
the first index fund in a series of academic papers. In 1965, Professor Paul

4. See infra to Section V.D.5.
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Samuelson published a seminal article in which he demonstrated mathematically that future stock prices fluctuate unpredictably. 5 That same year, Professor Eugene Fama coined his Efficient Market Hypothesis, which holds
that it is difficult, if not impossible, to outperform the stock market given that
market prices incorporate information quickly and efficiently. 6 In 1967, Professor Michael Jensen provided empirical proof to support Fama’s theory,
showing that, from 1945 to 1964, market indexes outperformed actively managed funds. 7 In 1973, Professor Burton G. Malkiel explicitly called for the
creation of the index fund: “[F]und spokesmen are quick to point out, ‘You
can’t buy the averages.’ It’s time the public could.” 8 Specifically, he called
for “a no-load, minimum-management-fee mutual fund that simply buys the
hundreds of stocks making up the broad stock-market averages and does no
trading [of securities].” 9 In other words, he called for an index fund.
B. Emergence of the Index Fund
Eventually, the call of these economists came to fruition: A man named
John Bogle filed the Declaration of Trust for the first index fund, First Index
Investment Trust, on December 31, 1975. 10 Bogle, founder of the Vanguard
Group, had successfully convinced his board to launch a fund that would attempt to simply mirror the performance of the S&P 500 rather than attempting to outperform the market by picking individual stocks. 11 The emergence
of this fund was met with great enthusiasm by Professor Paul Samuelson and
other economists, who lauded the fund for attempting to match a broad-based
index of the overall market, charging very low fees, having low portfolio
turnover, offering high levels of diversification, and being available to investors of modest means—features that would serve as hallmarks of index funds
going forward. 12
Despite the support of such economists, the initial performance of the
fund was characterized by Bogle himself as “a complete flop.” 13 The fund
5. Paul A. Samuelson, Proof That Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly, 6 INDUS.
MGMT. REV. 41 (1965).
6. Eugene F. Fama, Random Walks in Stock Market Prices, 21 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 55, 59
(1965).
7. Michael C. Jensen, The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945–1964, 23 J. FIN.
389 (1967).
8. BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 226 (1973).
9. Id.
10. John C. Bogle, The First Index Mutual Fund: A History of Vanguard Index Trust and the
(1997),
https://web.arVanguard
Index
Strategy,
VANGUARD
chive.org/web/20130507033534/http://www.vanguard.com/bogle_site/lib/sp19970401.html.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. The Index Fund Turns 40—And Gets Its Revenge, NASDAQ (Sept. 1, 2016),
https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/index-fund-turns-40-and-gets-its-revenge-2016-09-01.
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fell a whopping 95% short of its original goal for its initial public offering,
achieving a paltry $11.4 million in assets rather than the $150 million initially
envisioned. 14 Given its limited size, the fund was not even able to own all of
the stocks in the S&P 500 index, and it instead invested in only 280 stocks. 15
For its part, Wall Street as a whole seemed to reject the strategy of indexed investment. 16 Edward C. Johnson, III, Fidelity’s chairman at the time,
put it this way: “I can’t believe . . . that the great mass of investors are [sic]
going to be satisfied with just receiving average returns. The name of the
game is to be the best.” 17 Such a statement, however, ignored emerging data
on the general superiority of returns from index investing. 18 Due to a combination of hubris and self-interest, the major players in the industry were
loath to believe that funds that passively mirrored the market could be superior to funds that were directed and managed by some of America’s brightest
minds.
C. The Growth of Index Funds
As its poor initial reception foretold, the index fund remained relatively
obscure well into the 1980s. 19 The First Index Investment Trust attracted an
average of only $16 million per year in cash flow in its first decade, 20 and it
remained the sole index fund until 1984, when Wells Fargo opened a fund
that was also designed to match the performance of the S&P 500. 21
However, as time wore on, the index fund began to demonstrate the financial benefits of passive investing. From the period 1981 to 1986, Vanguard’s First Index Investment Trust outperformed actively managed funds
by 3.0 percentage points. 22 It again outperformed other funds by 2.1 percentage points from 1987 to 1992 and again by 2.6 percentage points from 1992
to 1997. 23
This success was noticed in the marketplace, and more and more competitor index funds emerged. 24 Even Fidelity came around, finally offering
its own index fund in 1990. 25 By 2000, index funds, and their cousin the
14. Bogle, supra note 10.
15. The Index Fund Turns 40—And Gets Its Revenge, supra note 13.
16. Bogle, supra note 10.
17. Id.
18. Jensen, supra note 7.
19. Bogle, supra note 10.
20. John C. Bogle, Bogle Sounds a Warning on Index Funds, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 29, 2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/bogle-sounds-a-warning-on-index-funds-1543504551.
21. Id.
22. Bogle, supra note 10.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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index-based exchange-traded fund (“ETF”), 26 had acquired 2% of the overall
equity market in the United States. 27
That figure, however, was only the beginning of index funds’ explosive
growth. By 2002, index funds had more than doubled their holdings to reach
4.5% of the entire U.S. stock market. 28 By 2009, the funds had doubled again
to 9%. 29 By 2018, the funds had nearly doubled yet again, reaching 17%. 30
Even 17% likely understates the scale of index fund ownership, as it
excludes index fund assets held by pension funds, insurance companies, nonprofits and foreign funds, as well as assets invested in “closet index funds”
(funds that totally or nearly track an index while claiming to be actively managed). 31 Altogether, index funds likely control greater than 20%, and potentially 30% or more, of nearly all publicly-traded companies in the United
States. 32 This figure is expected to grow further, with some predicting that
index funds will control the majority of shares at most American corporations
in the near future. 33
III. INDEX FUNDS’ INCREASING INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
As the index fund has grown, so too has the power of index funds to
influence corporate governance. This Part explores index funds’ increasing
influence on corporate governance. Section III.A examines index funds’
transition from relative inconsequence to a position of considerable influence
over corporate governance. Section III.B explores the key mechanisms by
which index funds exert that influence: (1) standard setting, (2) engagements,
26. ETFs are typically funds that issue shares in large blocks, creation units, to their participants. These units are then traded as shares on an exchange. Because these funds are often linked
to an index fund, they have much in common with index funds themselves. For most corporate
governance purposes and this paper as a whole, index funds and ETFs will be considered functionally equivalent and will be referred to generally as index funds. See John C. Coates IV, Reforming
the Taxation and Regulation of Mutual Funds: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 1 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 591, 682 (2009) (explaining the basic characteristics of ETFs); John C. Coates,
The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The Problem of Twelve, 1, 10 (Harv. Pub. L. Working
Paper No. 19-07, 2018) [hereinafter Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I] (explaining the functional similarity between ETFs and index funds).
27. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 10.
28. Bogle, supra note 20.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 10.
32. Id. at 13.
33. See Trevor Hunnicutt, Index Funds to Surpass Active Fund Assets in U.S. by 2024:
Moody’s, REUTERS (Feb. 2, 2017, 9:31 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-funds-passive/index-funds-to-surpass-active-fund-assets-in-u-s-by2024-moodys-idUSKBN15H1PN
(predicting
that index funds will hold over half of the market by 2024); Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 13 (“[E]ven if the trend flattens, the majority of most companies
will soon be owned by indexed funds.”).
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and (3) proxy voting. Throughout, it emphasizes the significant increase in
index funds’ influence in recent decades and how that influence stems primarily from index funds’ right to vote proxies for their voluminous holdings.
A. From Rational Apathy to Significant Influence
In the early days of the index fund, these vehicles owned such a small
share of the overall market that their ability to influence corporate behavior
was virtually non-existent. 34 Accordingly, it made sense for managers of index funds to be rationally apathetic to the management of portfolio companies and to defer to other market actors on corporate governance decisions.35
For their first few decades, index funds had no material impact on overall
corporate governance or on the behavior of individual firms.
The situation has changed enormously in recent decades: these funds
have gone from controlling virtually 0% of shares to controlling 20-30% of
shares at nearly all publicly traded companies in the United States. 36 Even
the sheer size of the holdings controlled by index funds understates their
power, as control of the index funds themselves is highly concentrated. Just
three index fund providers control the bulk of index fund assets. 37 Known
together as the “Big Three,” Vanguard, BlackRock, and State Street collectively own 81% of index funds assets. 38 Vanguard itself owns 51%, while
BlackRock owns 21%, and State Street owns 9%.39 In 2017, these three players controlled roughly 15% of the S&P 500, representing a radical departure
from the traditional dispersed ownership of the stock market. 40 Taken together, the Big Three constitute the largest investor in 88% of the S&P 500,
giving the trio an unprecedented hold on corporate America. 41
The nature of the index fund industry suggests that no competitors will
successfully wrest that control away from the Big Three. Low fees are a
cornerstone of the index fund business model, and it would be extraordinarily
difficult for a new competitor to outperform on fees given the massive economies of scale enjoyed by the Big Three. 42 Indeed, with some index funds
now charging no fees at all, 43 new funds likely have little financial incentive
34. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 10.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Bogle, supra note 20.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 10.
41. Eric A. Posner et al., A Proposal to Limit the Anticompetitive Power of Institutional Investors, 81 ANTITRUST L. J. 669, 676 (2017).
42. Bogle, supra note 20.
43. Fidelity offers Fidelity ZERO Large Cap Index Fund (“FNILX”), Fidelity ZERO Extended
Market Index Fund (“FZIPX”), Fidelity ZERO Total Market Index Fund (“FZROX”), and Fidelity
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to enter the market and little to gain if they do, further decreasing the likelihood of a new competitor emerging. 44 Thus, it appears that the concentrated
power of the Big Three is likely to endure.
The power of the Big Three is even greater than their substantial share
ownership suggests, due to the fact that a significant fraction of shareholders
do not vote their shares. 45 For example, only 28% of shares held by individual investors were voted at annual meetings in 2019. 46 Because of this absenteeism, index funds control a greater percentage of voted shares than they do
shares as a whole. 47 This amplifies their power over voting decisions. In
even reasonably close contests, such power has the potential to determine the
overall outcome. 48 Additionally, certain regulatory developments that have
decreased the number of votes cast, such as the elimination of discretionary
broker voting in uncontested director elections 49 and the implementation of
the e-proxy “notice and access” system, 50 have had the (likely unintended)
consequence of shifting additional power to the Big Three.
Overall, index funds have gone from having virtually no ability to influence corporate decisionmaking to having substantial influence in a remarkably short amount of time. As a result, the situation has transformed from one

ZERO International Index Fund (“FZILX”), which all feature a 0% expense ratio and no minimums
to invest. Mutual Fund Investing Ideas, FIDELITY, https://www.fidelity.com/mutual-funds/investing-ideas/index-funds (last visited Feb. 11, 2020).
44. Bogle, supra note 20.
45. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 13–14.
46. PROXYPULSE, 2019 PROXY SEASON REVIEW 5 (2019), https://www.broadridge.com/_assets/pdf/broadridge-proxypulse-2019-review.pdf.
47. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 13.
48. Jill E. Fisch, Assaf Hamdani, & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The New Titans of Wall Street:
A Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors 18 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working
Paper No. 414, 2018) (March 2019) (referring to passive investors’ power to determine the outcome
in many shareholder votes).
49. Prior to 2009, brokers were able to vote the shares of beneficial owners that did not provide
proxy voting instructions on matters that were considered “routine.” These shares historically represented a meaningful voting bloc, amounting to roughly 19% of the shares voted at annual meetings. On July 1, 2009, the SEC approved an amendment to NYSE Rule 452 which classified director
elections as “non-routine,” which effectively eliminated the ability of brokers to vote on candidates
for the board. Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or
Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J. 869, 873–74 (2010).
50. Luis A. Aguilar, Commissioner, Ensuring the Proxy Process Works for Shareholders, U.S.
SEC & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Feb. 19, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/021915psclaa.html (“I noted in February 2009 that retail investor voting, already at low numbers, had plummeted at those companies using the notice and access model permitted by this rule. Indeed, the
reports that compiled statistics on the level of participation by investors before and after the notice
and access model was put in place at their companies found decreases of over 30% for large investors, and over 60% for smaller investors. Other reports find that retail response rates have declined
each year since the introduction of the notice and access model, falling to less than a 13% response
rate for the period from July 1, 2013 to June 30, 2014.” (footnotes omitted)).
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where it was rational for index funds to be apathetic about corporate decisionmaking to one where they have their hands on the reigns of shareholder
power.
B. How Index Funds Exert Their Influence
Index funds exert their considerable influence in three primary channels:
(1) standard setting, (2) engagements, and (3) voting their shares. 51 Standard
setting involves establishing general principles that encapsulate voting priorities and beliefs about what constitutes good corporate governance. 52 The
index providers make these guidelines publicly available,53 an act which itself indirectly manifests the voting power of the index fund providers. 54 In
signaling how these funds will vote, index fund providers pressure companies
toward certain ends even before a vote has been called. 55 Additionally, by
publishing principles of “good corporate governance,” the Big Three index
providers (and other smaller players) have the opportunity to coordinate without colluding, thereby further enhancing their potential power over corporate
decisionmakers. 56
Second, index funds also participate in engagements. Engagements involve communication with management of a given company, whether in person, by phone, by mail, or over e-mail. 57 Through these communications,
index fund providers are able to express their priorities, concerns, and desires
directly to company management, thereby exerting influence over these decisionmakers. 58 These dialogues frequently result in portfolio companies altering their practices or procedures voluntarily. 59 Data suggest that these engagements are occurring at a substantial number of companies. In 2018,
Vanguard conducted engagements with 721 different firms, representing
47% of the firm’s total assets under management. 60 In 2018, BlackRock was
involved in 2049 company engagements with 1453 companies, representing
51. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 15–18.
52. Id. at 15.
53. See, e.g., VANGUARD INVESTMENT GROUP, INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP ANNUAL
REPORT (2018), https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/perspectives-and-commentary/2018_investment_stewardship_annual_report.pdf; BLACKROCK, BLACKROCK INVESTMENT
STEWARDSHIP: 2018 ANNUAL REPORT (2018), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-annual-stewardship-report-2018.pdf; STATE STREET GLOBAL ADVISORS,
STEWARDSHIP 2017 (2017), https://www.ssga.com/investment-topics/environmental-social-governance/2018/07/annual-stewardship-report-2017.pdf (last visited on Jan. 6, 2020).
54. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 15–16.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Fisch et al., supra note 48, at 24–25.
58. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 16.
59. Fisch et al., supra note 48, at 18–19.
60. See VANGUARD INVESTMENT GROUP, supra note 53, at 9.
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51.9% of BlackRock’s assets under management. 61 In 2017, State Street participated in a total of 2297 engagements, of which 676 involved direct communication, either in-person or via telephone. 62
Third, index funds wield power by voting the shares controlled by their
firm. 63 In 2003, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) issued a rule that required index fund providers to disclose how they voted their
shares in proxy vote contests. 64 Though not explicitly required by the rule,
index fund providers have since voted nearly all of their shares. 65 Given their
highly diversified holdings, the number of votes cast by these funds each year
is enormous. Vanguard voted on 168,786 proposals in 2018, 66 while
BlackRock voted on 158,942 proposals in 2018, 67 and State Street voted on
154,458 proposals in 2017. 68 These shares are typically voted in accordance
with the guidelines set out by the firms’ corporate governance teams and in
accordance with the priorities expressed in engagements. 69 In this way, each
of these channels of influence can be used to support the other.
IV. HOW INDEX FUNDS’ SHARES ARE VOTED
Given the power of index funds over corporate decisionmaking, a crucial question emerges: How do index funds identify voting priorities and ultimately vote their shares? This Part seeks to answer that question. Section
IV.A provides greater information on index funds’ approach to voting the
proxies under their control. It reveals that index funds’ votes are typically
cast in unison for individual funds at a given fund family and in a similar
manner for each of the Big Three index funds. It further finds that decisionmaking power is concentrated in the hands of a few individuals, who generally make decisions in a generic rather than case-by-case fashion. Section
IV.B examines the deficiencies inherent in index funds’ approach to voting.

61. BLACKROCK, supra note 53, at 7.
62. STATE STREET GLOBAL ADVISORS, supra note 53, at 60.
63. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 17.
64. Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management
Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8188, Exchange Act Release No. 47,304, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,922, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564, 6566 (Jan. 31, 2003) (“We believe,
however, that the time has now arrived for the Commission to require mutual funds to disclose their
proxy voting policies and procedures, and their actual voting records. Investors in mutual funds
have a fundamental right to know how the fund casts proxy votes on shareholders’ behalf.”).
65. Fisch et al., supra note 48, at 21.
66. VANGUARD INVESTMENT GROUP, supra note 53, at 34.
67. BLACKROCK, supra note 53, at 20.
68. STATE STREET GLOBAL ADVISORS, supra note 53, at 4.
69. See, e.g., VANGUARD INVESTMENT GROUP, supra note 53, at 3; BLACKROCK, supra note
53, at 5–7; STATE STREET GLOBAL ADVISORS, supra note 53, at 9–14.
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It argues that funds’ voting practices inadequately incorporate the preferences of individual investors and leave such investors with no meaningful
mechanism for proxy voting input.
A. Index Funds’ Approach to Voting
Stewardship and voting decisions for the enormous number of shares
controlled by the Big Three are typically made by a centralized investment
stewardship team, which is responsible for creating voting guidelines and
principles of good corporate governance, conducting engagements, and casting votes. 70 Because these teams generally make voting decisions for all the
shares controlled by the firm as a whole, the impact of the votes controlled
by a given index fund provider is consolidated and the firm’s impact on corporate decisionmaking is correspondingly amplified. 71 Data on the matter
reveal the scale of the coordination: In 2015, Vanguard’s many different investment funds voted in concert in all but 6 votes out of 100,000. 72 Similarly,
BlackRock voted its shares asynchronously on only 18 out of 100,000 proposals. 73 Likewise, State Street deviated on just 195 out of 100,000 proposals. 74 Such figures reveal that it is very rare indeed for index fund providers to vote subsets of shares in different ways. 75

70. See, e.g., STATE STREET GLOBAL ADVISORS, supra note 53, at 12 (“All voting and engagement activities are centralized within the stewardship team, irrespective of investment strategy
or geographic region.”); see also Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Agency Problems of Institutional
Investors, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 89, 95 (2017) (“[T]he voting and stewardship decisions of mutual
fund families are commonly concentrated in a single corporate governance department or proxy
voting department of the investment manager . . . .”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the
Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate
Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870, 1915 (2017) (“[T]he fund family will, at best, establish a
centralized voting unit comprised of comparatively less expensive employees, who will develop
voting policies and make sure government mandates for voting are satisfied.”).
71. See Strine, supra note 70, at 1913–14 (explaining that index fund owners get “no independent thinking at all or any separate voice” and that the “index fund will vote the same way as
the actively traded funds in the fund complex”); Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part
I, supra note 26, at 14 (noting that there is no “legal prohibition against an advisory firm from
voting, monitoring, or engaging with a given portfolio company on behalf of all of its funds in an
identical and coordinated manner” and that this means such a company’s senior management controls how all of its shares are exercised).
72. Fichtner et al., supra note 3, at 316–17.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. But see Dawn Lim & Cara Lombardo, Vanguard Is Handing Over Some of Its Voting
Power, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 25, 2019, 7:02 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/vanguard-is-handingover-some-of-its-voting-power-11556190120 (noting that firms which manage Vanguard’s active
equity funds will receive the power to vote on certain issues, a change affecting approximately 9%
of Vanguard’s assets).
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The investment stewardship teams making voting decisions are generally quite small in size: Vanguard has about twenty employees 76 who share
responsibility for researching and voting on 168,786 ballot items, 77 or
roughly 8400 per employee. Similarly, BlackRock employs thirty-six people
to analyze and vote on 158,942 proposals, or nearly 4500 issues per employee. 78 Finally, State Street has twelve people on staff 79 to investigate and
vote on over 154,458 proposals, 80 an average of about 12,900 issues per employee. These small teams must research, analyze, and draw conclusions on
a huge number of proposals of a large number of companies, a task impossible to do with any great specificity. 81
To reduce this enormous burden, the corporate governance teams at
each of these firms greatly simplify voting decisions by crafting a set of generic voting guidelines, which they follow closely in individual contests. 82
The policies crafted by these governance teams are remarkably consistent
across the Big Three, a consistency that has emerged despite the lack of consensus on best practices for corporate governance.83 All three firms support
director independence, seek to tie executive compensation to long-term performance, oppose antitakeover provisions, and generally oppose major
changes to corporate structure.84 Additionally, representatives from one index fund provider regularly meet with representatives from other index fund
providers. 85 In these discussions, the index fund representatives develop and
discuss approaches to corporate governance, a process that yields “significant
coordination over many if not all topics on which shareholders routinely
vote.” 86 As with the concentration of vote decisionmaking at the firm level
rather than the fund level, the unity between investment advisory firms has
the effect of strengthening the voice of the Big Three, for better or worse.

76. VANGUARD INVESTMENT GROUP, INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP ANNUAL REPORT 2
(2017), https://www.wlrk.com/docs/VanguardInvestmentStewardshipReport2017.pdf (“Our team
has doubled in size since 2015, and we now stand at more than [twenty] analysts, researchers, and
operations team members.”).
77. VANGUARD INVESTMENT GROUP , supra note 53, at 7.
78. BLACKROCK, supra note 53, at 4, 20.
79. E-mail from Olivia Offner, Vice President, State Street Media Relations, to Caleb N. Griffin, Assistant Professor, Belmont University College of Law (Feb. 12, 2019, 12:24 PM) (on file
with author).
80. STATE STREET GLOBAL ADVISORS, supra note 53.
81. Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP. L. 493, 516
(2018).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 15.
86. Id.

966

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 79:954

An advantage of reliance upon generalized voting guidelines is that such
an approach reduces the costs of engagement and research, a valuable feature
for funds that prize themselves on their low fees. 87 These guidelines also
provide index fund providers with influence over corporate actors, as these
guidelines send signals to portfolio companies, which may preemptively
comply with the guidelines before a vote is even called. 88 Further, such an
approach complies with federal regulations, which require investment advisers exercising voting authority over an index funds’ proxies to “[a]dopt and
implement written policies and procedures that are reasonably designed to
ensure that [the investment advisers] vote client securities in the best interest
of clients.” 89
However, critics argue that this type of generalized, “unthinking” corporate governance “will make many companies worse off.”90 Common critiques of this approach to corporate governance include that it concentrates
too much power in the hands of too few individuals, 91 favors certain behaviors and activities that are not necessarily superior, 92 and empowers individuals with insufficient incentives to promote optimal corporate governance. 93
Corporate governance teams also simplify their task by availing themselves of the services of outside proxy advisory firms. These firms provide
research support and voting recommendations to their clients. Like the index
fund industry itself, the proxy advisory market is highly concentrated. Only
two firms, Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”) and Glass Lewis, control a staggering 97% of the market for proxy advisory services. 94 Unsurprisingly, then, all of the Big Three rely upon the recommendations and research

87. Lund, supra note 81, at 512.
88. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 15.
89. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-6 (2016).
90. Lund, supra note 81, at 495.
91. See, e.g., Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 25, at 10 (warning that indexation is concentrating power in the hands of a small number of individuals); Fisch et
al., supra note 48, at 37–41 (arguing that indexation is causing a worrisome concentration of stock
ownership).
92. Lund, supra note 81, at 518 (arguing that good corporate governance is “endogenous to the
particular firm” and that the failure of index funds to vote with specificity is therefore inconsistent
with good corporate governance).
93. See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., supra note 70, at 90 (arguing “that index funds have especially
poor incentives to engage in stewardship activities that could improve governance and increase
value”); Lund, supra note 81, at 512 (“[U]nlike active funds, passive funds have no financial incentive to monitor management or invest in governance interventions.”); Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 15 (stating “index provider managers have very weak
incentives to use their control, at least as conventionally understood”).
94. Bryce C. Tingle, The Agency Cost Case for Regulating Proxy Advisory Firms, 49 U.B.C.
L. REV. 725, 743 (2016).
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of ISS, and BlackRock also utilizes Glass Lewis for research support. 95 Outsourcing some of the burden for researching and casting proxy votes has the
potential to reduce costs, simplify voting, and provide an outside and potentially objective perspective on important decisions for low-cost index
funds. 96 However, proxy advisors have also been critiqued for a number of
faults, including a lack of transparency, 97 simplistic research methods,98 the
lack of competition in the market for proxy advisory services,99 and insufficient incentives. 100 The fact that many of these critiques mimic critiques of
the corporate governance teams themselves suggests that proxy advisory
firms may not be a sufficient tool to overcome the limitations facing index
funds in casting their votes.
Overall, then, the nature of index fund voting can be summarized as
unified (as votes are typically cast in unison within an individual firm), synchronous (as votes are typically cast similarly across the Big Three), concentrated (as decision-making power is in the hands of a small group), and nonspecific (as voting decisions generally adhere to a set of generalized principles). The advantages of these features in reducing costs, simplifying the
voting process, and strengthening the voice of index funds also entail corresponding costs in the form of reducing the thoroughness of analysis, decreasing specificity of recommendations, and potentially over-empowering individuals with insufficient incentives to promote optimal corporate
governance. Moreover, the unified, synchronous, concentrated, and non-specific voting decisions of the Big Three risk creating and enforcing a corporate

95. Lund, supra note 81, at 516.
96. See The Investment Stewardship Ecosystem, BLACKROCK VIEWPOINT (July 12, 2018),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/whitepaper/viewpoint-investment-stewardshipecosystem-july-2018.pdf (extolling the benefits of proxy advisors); see also Bebchuk et al., supra
note 70, at 109 (raising the concern that “a reduction in the activities of proxy advisors would not
be offset by increased spending on analysis by institutional investors sufficient to maintain even
their current levels of monitoring”).
97. See, e.g., Rachel McTague, Chamber Approaches RiskMetrics with Proposed Changes to
Policy-Setting, 40 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 569, 589 (2008) (noting that the proxy firm’s “lack of transparency” has led the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to describe ISS’s process for making proxy recommendations as a “black box”).
98. See, e.g., Charles M. Nathan et al., Proxy Advisory Business: Apotheosis or Apogee?,
CORP. GOVERNANCE COMMENT. (Latham & Watkins LLP, Los Angeles, Cal.), Mar. 2011, at 1, 4,
https://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub4042_1.pdf (“In essence, proxy advisory firms
cope with their problem of large numbers and seasonality through automation of as large a portion
of the vote recommendation process as feasible.”).
99. See, e.g., Asaf Eckstein & Sharon Hannes, A Long/Short Incentive Scheme for Proxy Advisory Firms, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 787, 797–98 (2018) (noting the “extreme lack of competition in the proxy advisory industry” and the importance of competition for “improving the quality
of proxy advisory services”).
100. See, e.g., id. at 817 (proposing ways to strengthen proxy advisory firms’ incentives to produce high-quality research).
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governance monoculture. Such voting may advance a set of corporate governance principles that do not necessarily constitute best practices and that
may not reflect the true interests and values of the index fund investors themselves.
B. What Index Fund Voting Is Not
As the foregoing has decidedly emphasized, index fund voting can be
characterized by its remarkable uniformity, a uniformity which can be observed in the concentration of voting power in the hands of a single team at
each index fund provider, in the coordinated way in which the individual
funds of a given index fund provider tend to vote, and in the coordinated
preferences and priorities of the Big Three index fund providers. In stark
contrast, however, the millions of individual index fund investors on behalf
of whom the Big Three cast their votes exhibit remarkable diversity. 101 Indeed, index funds hold the funds of a sizable subset of the American investing
public, and index fund investors reflect the diverse characteristics of society
at large. Index fund investors include the young, the middle aged, and the
elderly. Some are mere days away from retirement, while others are decades
away. 102 Index fund investors include politically liberal, politically conservative, and apolitical individuals, and these political affiliations likely would
correlate to differing opinions on corporate political speech, political donations, and other more general matters. 103 Given the option, some index funds
investors would assuredly sacrifice financial gains for environmental or social benefits while others would not choose to do so. 104 Even Vanguard’s

101. See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53
UCLA L. REV. 561, 577 (2006) (pointing out that shareholders come “in different flavors”); Stephen
M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L.
REV. 547, 557 (2003) (referencing “shareholders’ widely divergent interests” as a problem for directors in making consensus decisions); Eric W. Orts, The Complexity and Legitimacy of Corporate
Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1565, 1591 (1993) (arguing that directors should consider divergent
shareholder interests in their decisionmaking); Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge
v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163, 174 (2008) (noting that shareholders have differing interests).
102. Anabtawi, supra note 101, at 579 (pointing out that shareholders have divergent time horizons for their investments).
103. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who
Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 111–17 (2010) (discussing potential solutions to situations where
shareholders disagree on political issues such as corporate political speech).
104. Indeed, many index fund investors are already opting to invest in funds specifically designated as socially responsible. For instance, investors have already chosen to invest $4.4 billion in
Vanguard’s “Vanguard FTSE Social Index Fund,” (a “low-cost fund [that] seeks to track a benchmark of large- and mid-capitalization stocks that have been screened for certain social, human
rights, and environmental criteria” intended to serve investors who “choose investments based on
social and personal beliefs”). Vanguard FTSE Social Index Fund Investor Shares, VANGUARD,
https://investor.vanguard.com/mutual-funds/profile/VFTSX (last visited Feb. 11, 2020). Despite
this supposed social orientation, however, it is likely that socially responsible index funds vote in
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investment stewardship team recognizes that its “shareholders have a wide
range of ideological perspectives.” 105 Index fund investors also vary substantially in their financial situation—some are rich while some are of modest
means. 106 Based upon the heterogeneity of investors themselves, it is undeniable that the individual interests and preferences of individual index fund
investors can differ significantly from the uniform approaches taken on their
behalf by index funds and their corporate governance teams. 107
With that in mind, index fund voting can also be usefully described by
what it is not. Index fund voting is not varied. Although there is no consensus on corporate governance, the Big Three have taken a consensus approach
to corporate governance. 108 Consequently, index fund investors lack the ability to express voting preferences by selecting a particular index fund provider.
Index fund voting is not differentiated. The various individual funds
owned by a given investment company typically vote in unison, despite considerable variation in their clientele and holdings. 109 Indeed, even when investors have opted to invest in a fund with an expressed commitment to a
social value, such as environmental sustainability, the fund often fails to vote
in line with that commitment. 110 This lack of variation means that individual
investors are also unable to express voting preferences through their selection
of individual funds.
Further, index fund voting is not individualized. It does not reflect the
individual preferences of the actual index fund investors, including their
unique financial circumstances, political and social values, priorities, investment time horizon, or employment situation. Rather, the votes controlled by

concert with all of Vanguards other index funds, even on questions that relate to social, human
rights, and environmental matters. See Strine, supra note 70, at 1936.
105. VANGUARD INVESTMENT GROUP, supra note 53, at 2.
106. The mean income of families with some number of holdings sheds light on the diversity in
income that can be exhibited by investors. Those in the bottom 20% had a mean income of $15,100
while those in the top 10% had a mean income $260,200, based upon data from 2016. FED.
RESERVE, 2016 SCF CHARTBOOK 8 (2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/files/BulletinCharts.pdf. Though this data includes individuals with a great variety of holdings and not solely
index funds, it is likely that index fund investors would similarly include individuals with diverse
financial circumstances.
107. Anabtawi, supra note 101, at 577–92 (2006) (detailing key differences between shareholders and how those differences would result in different priorities for firm management); William B.
Chandler III, On the Instructiveness of Insiders, Independents, and Institutional Investors, 67 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1083, 1092 (1999) (“[I]nstitutional investors’ and individual shareholders’ interests
may diverge.”).
108. Lund, supra note 81, at 516.
109. Strine, supra note 70, at 1913–14.
110. Id. at 1913 (noting that “[i]f you invest in a fund that is supposed to be ‘socially responsible,’ it is likely to vote on issues in exactly the same way as the other funds in the fund family,
however inconsistent that is with the fund’s stated purpose”).
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index funds are almost exclusively cast in unison. 111 An individual human
investor cannot rely upon an index fund provider to even be aware of his or
her individual interests when making voting decisions, let alone to act upon
those interests.
As it stands, the human investors who collectively make up index funds
have virtually no way to ensure that the votes cast on their behalf are cast in
line with their preferences or priorities. Heterogeneity does not exist in the
way an individual’s proportional shares are voted, nor does it meaningfully
exist at the fund level or even the index fund provider level. Thus, human
investors are well characterized as “not so much citizens of the corporate
governance republic as they are the voiceless and choiceless many.” 112 They
lack both a direct voice on corporate governance matters as well as the opportunity to make even an indirect or constrained choice.
V. IMPACT OF INDEX FUND VOTING ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The concentration of voting power in the hands of index funds’ corporate governance teams represents a significant departure from the traditional
management and ownership structure of corporations. This Part explores the
key effects of this profound change. Section V.A explores how the rise in
index fund power has resulted in a transformation from the classic BerleMeans corporation characterized by the separation of ownership and control
to a situation of minority control for most large publicly-traded corporations.
Section V.B summarizes key empirical studies on the real-world effects of
index funds’ control. Section V.C discusses academics and commentators’
increasing concern over index funds’ governance influence. Section V.D categorizes those key concerns.
A. Index Funds and “Minority Control”
Since Professors Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means first explicated the
concept in their seminal 1932 text, modern corporations have been thought
to feature as a primary characteristic the separation of ownership and control,
where the shareholder owners have substantial ownership and minimal control and the managers have substantial control and minimal ownership. 113
This separation of ownership and control has been taken as a given in virtually all corporate law scholarship, with scholars focusing on mitigating the

111. Id. at 1913–14.
112. Id. at 1872.
113. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 2–5 (1932).
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agency costs stemming from this separation. 114 However, Berle and Means
also identified an important exception to the separation of ownership and
control assumed in a modern corporation. 115 They demonstrated that the separation of ownership and control hinged upon the dispersed ownership of
stocks—even a relatively small, non-majority, block of stocks could give its
owner effective control over the enterprise as a whole.116 Berle and Means
described corporations with substantial control in the hands of a single individual as minority-controlled corporations, which they distinguished from
management-controlled corporations. 117
How much control in the hands of a single owner transforms a corporation from a manger-controlled to a minority-controlled corporation? Berle
and Means noted that the “dividing line between control by a minority interest and control by management is not clear.” 118 However, they classified
corporations according to the following guidelines: Corporations with below
5% minority ownership constituted management control, corporations with
5–20% minority ownership constituted joint minority and management control, and corporations with 20–50% minority ownership constituted minority
control. 119 For his part, John Bogle deemed 30% ownership to be the threshold for “effective control” over a corporation. 120
As index funds have gained control over an increasingly large percentage of the shares of individual corporations, they have almost decidedly entered into the territory labeled by Berle and Means as constituting “joint minority and management control” for most large corporations and may be
nearing Bogle’s threshold for “effective control.” 121 If, as is predicted, 122
index funds continue to draw additional investment, it is possible that they
will increasingly wield pure “minority control” or perhaps even majority control over a substantial swath of corporate America. 123

114. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Politics of Corporate Governance, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 671, 672 (1995).
115. BERLE, JR. & MEANS, supra note 113, at 80–84.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 84–88.
118. Id. at 85.
119. Id. at 109.
120. Bogle, supra note 20 (stating that in the near future, “the ‘Big Three’ might own 30% or
more of the U.S. stock market—effective control”).
121. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 13 (stating “indexed
funds now own more than 20% and perhaps 30% or more of nearly all U.S. public companies”).
122. Bogle, supra note 20.
123. See Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 13 (“[E]ven if
the trend flattens, the majority of most companies will soon be owned by indexed funds.”); Hunnicutt, supra note 33 (predicting that index funds will hold over half of the market by 2024).
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B. Empirical Studies of the Impact of Index Funds’ “Minority
Control”
The real-world impact of index funds’ control can already be observed
in some empirical analyses of corporate behaviors. At a general level, several
scholars have provided empirical confirmation that index funds do actively
wield their considerable power over corporate decisionmakers. For example,
Professor Joseph A. McCahery and his co-authors use a survey methodology
to confirm that institutional investors actively deploy their influence to shape
corporate governance decisions and conduct direct engagements with management to shape behaviors. 124 They also found that long-term investors
(such as index fund investors) intervene more intensely than their short-term
counterparts. 125
Whether these engagement efforts yield positive or negative benefits is
less clear in the literature. On the one hand, some scholars have found positive benefits from index fund providers’ engagement in corporate governance
activities. For instance, Professor Ian Appel and his co-authors demonstrate
that increased index fund ownership in a given corporation is associated with
(1) an increased share of independent directors; (2) an increased likelihood
that takeover defenses, particularly poison pills and restrictions on the ability
to call special meetings, will be removed; and (3) a decreased likelihood that
firms will have unequal voting rights (such as a dual class share structure). 126
The authors found that these interventions were associated with improved
long-term performance. 127 Likewise, Professor Jarrad Harford and his coauthors demonstrate that index fund investment is correlated with strong corporate governance, reduced managerial misbehaviors, decreased external financing, increased payouts to shareholders, and overall higher returns for
shareholders. 128
On the other hand, scholars have also identified quantifiable harms associated with index funds’ growing power over corporate governance efforts.
Economist Jonathan Brogaard and his co-authors suggest, based on the effect
of introducing indexing in the commodities markets, that index fund control
over a given industry may be associated with worse production decisions,
lower profits, and higher costs. 129 Additionally, Economist José Azar and his
124. Joseph A. McCahery et al., Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance Preferences of
Institutional Investors, 71 J. FIN. 2905, 2929 (2016).
125. Id.
126. Ian R. Appel et al., Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners, 121 J. FIN. ECON. 111, 114
(2016).
127. Id. at 129.
128. Jarrad Harford et al., Do Long-Term Investors Improve Corporate Decision Making?, 50
J. CORP. FIN. 424, 426 (2018).
129. Jonathan Brogaard et al., The Economic Impact of Index Investing, 32 REV. FIN. STUD.
3461 (2019).
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colleagues have suggested that index funds’ considerable influence on natural competitor firms has demonstrably reduced competition and therefore resulted in higher prices for consumers. 130 Though they focus on the airline
industry as a test case, they suggest that these outcomes may be observed
across the economy as a whole. 131 Cornelius Schmidt and Rüdiger Fahlenbrach also find negative consequences from increased index fund ownership. 132 They demonstrate such ownership to be associated with increased
CEO power, fewer independent director appointments, decreased returns after appointments of new independent directors, and qualitatively worse merger and acquisition activity. 133
Thus, the literature seems to provide convincing evidence that index
funds are influencing the ways in which corporations are managed. Whether
that influence is for better or worse is unclear, and it is certainly possible that
index funds yield mixed effects. At any rate, the data do not provide clear
indication that index funds are either exclusively beneficial or exclusively
harmful.
C. Concern over “Minority Control”
At the descriptive level, a whole chorus of voices have emerged expressing concern that the increased concentration of power over corporate governance in the hands of index funds will produce negative outcomes for investors
at large and for the economy as a whole. These concerns have been expressed
in the popular press. John Bogle himself issued a warning in The Wall Street
Journal about the growing power of index funds: “If historical trends continue, a handful of giant institutional investors will one day hold voting control of virtually every large U.S. corporation. Public policy cannot ignore
this growing dominance . . . .” 134 These concerns have been echoed by academics, including Professor John Coates, who recently issued a similar prediction:
[I]ndex providers are increasingly a, if not the, dominant force in
governance of public companies. As they accumulate more and
more assets, they accumulate more and more votes. Those votes,
even if coupled to tiny staffs and modest expenditures on monitoring, create real power. That power creates a legitimacy and accountability challenge. The power is held by agents, and because
130. José Azar et al., Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership, 73 J. FIN. 1513, 1517
(2018).
131. Id.
132. Cornelius Schmidt & Rüdiger Fahlenbrach, Do Exogenous Changes in Passive Institutional Ownership Affect Corporate Governance and Firm Value?, 124 J. FIN. ECON. 285, 297
(2017).
133. Id.
134. Bogle, supra note 20.
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of how important large public companies are, those agents have
increasing influence over the economy, society, and both the inputs
and outputs of the political system. For a dozen individuals to hold
such power . . . is not a sustainable political or legal equilibrium. 135
As these statements indicate, there is growing concern over the rising power
of index funds and increased interest in taking steps to manage or control that
power.
D. Key Concerns
Concerns about the rising power of index funds vary, and they sometimes contradict one another other. However, it is possible to compile a discrete list of key concerns regarding the increased power of index funds, which
include: (1) the inherent problems with concentration of power, (2) homogeneity in the voting and standard setting promoted by index fund providers,
(3) insufficient incentives and resources to ensure that power is well-used,
(4) the problematic separation of ownership from ownership that is a fundamental feature of the structure of index funds, (5) agency costs accompanying
this separation of ownership from ownership, (6) competitive effects, and (7)
potential passivity. These concerns will be discussed in turn in the subsections that follow.
1. Concentration of Power
A fundamental concern centers on the inherent problems associated with
concentration of power. 136 Vesting substantial control over corporate America in the hands of a few individuals increases the incentive and opportunity
for those individuals to use that power to promote self-interested aims. 137
Additionally, even where these individuals mean well, they may make incorrect judgments about the optimal course of action, and the negative consequences of their misjudgments will be magnified by the scale of their power
in the marketplace. 138

135. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 19.
136. Bogle, supra note 20.
137. See Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 18–19 (describing how index fund managers may be able to use their positions of power to obtain private benefits,
such as political office or business relationships with the corporations in which they vote, in a way
that has the potential to harm index fund investors).
138. See Lund, supra note 81, at 516.
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At the same time, some commentators see concentration of power as a
potential benefit, given that it has the potential to overcome the rational apathy of individual investors. 139 Additionally, the fact that this power is concentrated in the hands of individuals (ideally) concerned with the welfare of
ordinary investors means that this power may be used as a counterweight to
the power of hedge funds, short term investors, self-interested investors, and
self-dealing directors. 140 Thus, the challenge is to address concerns about
concentration of power “without losing the corporate governance benefits of
increased monitoring that flow from less dispersed ownership.” 141
2. Homogeneity in Voting and Standard Setting
A related concern involves the tendency for the shares controlled by index funds to vote in similar ways both at the fund level and at the index fund
provider level. As mentioned above, the Big Three tend to vote all shares
controlled by their many individual funds and adhere to similar principles of
“good corporate governance.” 142 Problematically, however, there is no consensus on best practices of corporate governance.143 It may be that all or
some of the Big Three’s policies do not promote optimal outcomes for index
fund investors or the economy as a whole, as is potentially suggested by some
of the negative economic analyses of index funds and their effects on corporate behaviors. 144
Because there is no way for an individual investor to express a preference for a certain behavior or approach to corporate governance (such an option does not exist at the individual vote level, the fund level, or even the
index fund provider level), there is no way for individual shareholders to alter
the behavior of index funds or to express a preference towards different approaches and priorities. 145 This means that while portfolio companies will
attempt to win the approval of index fund providers by adhering to their principles of corporate governance, the index fund providers themselves are un-

139. Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice,
39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 821–22 (1992); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89
MICH. L. REV. 520, 575–91 (1990); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside
Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 879 (1991).
140. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 13.
141. Id. at 22.
142. See supra notes 82–86 and accompanying text.
143. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 697 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906
A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (referring to “the protean nature of ideal corporate governance practices, particularly over an era that has included the Enron and WorldCom debacles”); Lund, supra note 81,
at 516 (referring to the lack of consensus on principles of corporate governance).
144. See supra notes 129–133 and accompanying text.
145. See supra Section IV.A.
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der little competitive pressure to pursue optimal principles of corporate governance. This has the effect of entrenching the priorities of the Big Three—
even though they may not be optimal—rather than permitting a competitive
marketplace wherein firms can distinguish themselves by their superior performance. Some scholars have identified the corporate governance standards
of the Big Three and their proxy advisors as “close to binding” on company
management. 146
3. Insufficient Incentives and Resources
Third, a related concern is that index fund agents have insufficient incentives and resources to yield their power over firms in a manner conducive
to optimal corporate governance. The lack of incentives stems from a variety
of causes. One cause is that index fund corporate governance employees do
not experience a significant direct benefit when a portfolio company does
well (or the reverse if a company does poorly). 147 A second cause is that
index funds are committed to owning all companies in the index regardless
of how any individual company performs. 148 A third cause is that index funds
compete on fees and therefore have an incentive to minimize the expenses
associated with their corporate governance efforts. 149 Altogether, the lack of
incentives and resources raises concerns that index fund providers are illpoised and insufficiently motivated to promote optimal corporate governance, which creates a particularly problematic situation given the scale of
their influence.

146. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Index Funds and Corporate Governance: Let Shareholders Be Shareholders 1, 5 (Jan. 31, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/1-Edward-Rock-Cover-Sheet-2019-01-15-at-10.51.07AM.pdf.
147. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 70, at 93 (noting that index fund providers “invest other
people’s money,” which reduces their incentives to promote optimal governance); Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 15 (noting index fund providers have “weak
incentives to do anything” given their fee structure).
148. Lund, supra note 81, at 511 (“Because a passive fund seeks only to match the performance
of a market index—not outperform it—the fund lacks a financial incentive to ensure that the companies in their portfolio are well run.”).
149. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 70, at 93 (arguing that index fund providers have incentives
to underspend on stewardship); Jill E. Fisch, Standing Voting Instructions: Empowering the Excluded Retail Investor, 102 MINN. L. REV. 11, 52 (2017) (“Some institutions, such as index funds,
compete by minimizing their operating expenses, and devoting substantial resources to governance
research may be in tension with that business model.”).
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4. Separation of Ownership from Ownership
A fourth concern relates to what is known as the “separation of ownership from ownership.” 150 This concept refers to the fact that money managers, including index fund providers, wield the power to vote on behalf of their
clients, but that these agents do not necessarily have interests aligned with
their investors. 151 Indeed, these managers may not even know their clients’
interests and priorities, and they do not currently undertake any efforts to
ascertain the true perspectives of individual clients.152 Though they are
charged with acting on behalf of clients, they do so by considering the interests of an abstract, generalized investor rather than dealing with the particular
nuances of their actual client base. 153
5. Agency Costs
A related concern is that the interests of index fund management are
divorced from those of the actual human investors controlling the shares.
This means that these managers might use their considerable power to pursue
self-interested ends or private benefits, rather than the best interests of index
fund investors. 154 Such benefits might include establishing relationships and
connections that would advance their career, furthering their clout in academic or social circles, positioning themselves to run for political office, pursuing personal values in their corporate governance efforts, or other such actions. Because index funds have substantial power and vest that power in
small corporate governance teams, those concerns are magnified.
6. Competitive Effects
A sixth concern is that the rising power of index funds is producing anticompetitive effects. 155 It is feared that by reducing pressure on natural competitors through their large ownership shares in each of the competing firms,
index funds are providing these entities with the opportunity to raise prices. 156
These price increases are detrimental for consumers and the economy overall,

150. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the
Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 449 (2014).
151. Id.
152. See Strine, supra note 70, at 1913–14.
153. See id.
154. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 18.
155. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267, 1307 (2016);
Posner et al., supra note 41, at 669–70.
156. Posner et al., supra note 41, at 669.
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and they may even be a net negative for index fund investors themselves. 157
Economic research suggests that these abstract concerns may be born out in
the real world, with scholars associating index fund ownership with price increases in both the airline 158 and commodities industries. 159
7. Passivity
A seventh concern is passivity on the part of index fund managers.
Some commentators fear that, because index fund managers and corporate
governance teams do not have strong incentives to engage in good corporate
governance, they will be passive with regards to corporate governance. 160
This passivity, in turn, may decrease monitoring of firms by shareholders,
reduce incentives for good corporate governance, and increase opportunities
for mismanagement and self-dealing on the part of corporate directors and
managers. 161 This concern, of course, runs counter to concerns about the
index funds’ increasing power over corporate governance standards but reflects the same underlying fear: The growth of index fund investing will result in worse corporate governance and worse monitoring of portfolio companies.
VI. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES
Given the increasing attention to this issue, a number of corporate law
scholars have proposed policy solutions that attempt to mitigate concerns
over the growing concentration of power in the hands of index funds or to
preserve the status quo. This Article responds to these proposals in the subsections that follow.

157. For a discussion of how price increases may disserve ordinary investors even if they produce share price gains, see Caleb N. Griffin, Mergers Aren’t So Black & White, 43 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 213 (2019).
158. Azar et al., supra note 130, at 1516.
159. Brogaard et al., supra note 129.
160. See, e.g., Ashley Alder, Chief Exec. Officer, Sec. & Future Comm’n, Keynote Speech at
Companies Registry Corporate Governance Roundtable 1 (Mar. 13, 2017) (transcript available at
http://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/files/ER/PDF/Speeches/AIA_20170313.pdf) (“If a large slice of institutional investor money is passive, this could mean that few of them have any interest in holding
boards to account. The concern is that if boards do not feel accountable to shareholders, incentives
for good governance could wither away.”); Michael Blanding, Vanguard, Trian and the Problem
with ‘Passive’ Index Funds, HARV. BUS. SCH.: WORKING KNOWLEDGE (Jan. 30, 2017),
https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/passive-index-fund-leaders-push-for-shareholder-reforms (identifying
concerns that “[i]ndex funds are the major shareholders in many large- and medium-sized public
companies, but their passive investment nature offers few checks on those companies’ executives.”).
161. Alder, supra note 160, at 5.
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A. No Action
One potential course of action would be to do nothing. 162 Such an approach does not necessitate pretending that there are no problems with the
status quo but, rather, deciding that the status quo is superior to any proposed
solution. Professors Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock endorse such a course
of action because they believe that “no proposed fix can do better” than the
status quo. 163
However, it is unclear that index fund investors are doing a sufficient
job of advancing index fund investors’ actual interests and values. The simplified voting guidelines crafted and utilized by index fund stewardship teams
are not tailored to individual clients’ situations or values, and there is no way
for those investors to express a preference because of the homogeneity in the
corporate governance approaches at the fund and index provider level. Additionally, one of Kahan and Rocks’ rationales for their proposal to preserve
the status quo is that managers at the Big Three index funds have “direct
financial incentives to vote intelligently that are typically larger than any
other shareholder,” 164 signaling out individual investors as one group with far
smaller financial incentives. 165 However, relying upon dollar value of the
financial stake is an imperfect way to measure incentives. For example, it
seems unlikely that a billionaire would be ten times more motivated by a raise
of fifty dollars per hour than a person of modest means would be motivated
by a raise of five dollars per hour. Though the dollar value of financial incentives at stake matters, so does the relative impact of that financial stake
on a given portfolio, whether those financial incentives are internalized by
any individual actor, and whether financial gains are accompanied by any
negative externalities. 166
B. Stewardship Codes
A second approach to the corporate governance challenges implicated
by the growing power of index funds would be to implement voluntary stewardship codes. 167 These stewardship codes would commit adherents to

162. Kahan & Rock, supra note 146, at 55 (analyzing the status quo, noting advantages and
disadvantages of index funds’ power, considering alternatives and concluding “[u]ntil and unless
there is a proposal that would significantly improve matters, we should just let shareholders be
shareholders”).
163. Id. at 55.
164. Id. at 1.
165. Id. at 16.
166. See Fisch, supra note 149, at 45 (stating that “[e]ven if a retail investor’s stake in a voting
outcome is relatively small, the underlying investment is likely to be economically meaningful to
that shareholder,” a rationale which also applies to the investments of index fund investors).
167. See Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 20.

980

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 79:954

providing periodic reporting on stewardship activities and to increasing transparency. 168 However, as voluntary commitments, these codes would likely
be modest in their effects. 169 Additionally, the corporate governance teams
for all of the Big Three index fund providers already provide annual reporting
on their investment stewardship activities (including engagements),170 and
they are relatively transparent about their corporate governance priorities 171
and their actual voting behaviors. 172 In fact, registered management investment companies are already required to disclose both the policies and procedures guiding their voting decisions and their actual voting record. 173 As
such, efforts to increase transparency and disclosures would likely not present a significant departure from the status quo. Overall, stewardship codes
seem unlikely to address the fundamental concerns with index fund voting
described in Section V.D., though they would be a step to further highlight
the importance of transparency and disclosure.

168. Id.
169. Id. at 20–21.
170. Vanguard has its 2018 investment stewardship report available as of the time of this writing. It is a forty-four page document summarizing Vanguard’s four pillars of good governance, its
structure and approach to investment stewardship, and case studies highlighting its efforts to engage
directly with corporations. See VANGUARD INVESTMENT GROUP, supra note 53. Likewise,
BlackRock also has its 2018 investment stewardship report publicly available at the time of this
writing. The report summarizes BlackRock’s investment stewardship efforts over the past year and
details the company’s principles, priorities, and engagement commentaries. BLACKROCK, supra
note 53. State Street also provides data and analysis on its investment stewardship activities in its
annual report. This document also summarizes State Street’s stewardship philosophy and objectives. STATE STREET GLOBAL ADVISORS, supra note 53.
171. Vanguard provides a statement of its voting guidelines on its website. See VANGUARD
INVESTMENT GROUP, VANGUARD’S PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES (2019), https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/portfolio-company-resources/proxy_voting_guidelines.pdf.
Likewise, BlackRock similarly publishes its proxy voting guidelines. See BLACKROCK,
BLACKROCK INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND PROXY VOTING
GUIDELINES FOR U.S. SECURITIES (2020), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/factsheet/blk-responsible-investment-guidelines-us.pdf. Likewise, State Street also provides digital access to its engagement and voting guidelines for its holdings in various world regions online. See
STATE STREET GLOBAL ADVISORS, ASSET STEWARDSHIP (2020), https://www.ssga.com/us/en/individual/etfs/insights/informing-better-decisions-with-esg.
172. Vanguard makes the details of all proxy votes cast freely available online. See How Our
Funds Voted, VANGUARD INVESTMENT GROUP, https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/how-our-funds-voted/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2020). Likewise, BlackRock makes its complete
vote
records
available
online.
See
Investment
Stewardship,
BLACKROCK
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/about-us/investment-stewardship#our-responsibility
(last
visited Feb. 23, 2020). State Street also provides digital access to its engagement and voting guidelines for its holdings in various world regions online. See Asset Stewardship, STATE STREET
GLOBAL ADVISORS, https://www.ssga.com/global/en/about-us/asset-stewardship.html (last visited
Feb. 23, 2020).
173. Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management
Investment Companies, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564, 6566 (Feb. 7, 2003).
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C. Public Enforcement or Auditing of Good Stewardship
A third, related proposal to address the concentration of power in the
hands of index funds involves enforcement of good stewardship practices,
such as transparency and disclosure, through legal obligations and/or auditing. 174 Like the prior approach, however, these legal obligations would be
unlikely to significantly change the status quo, as the existing index fund providers are relatively transparent and are under some degree of legal obligation
to continue that transparency. 175 The costs accompanying auditing or other
enforcement mechanisms might also raise the prices of index fund services,
which would negatively affect index fund investors. 176 Overall, enforcement
of good stewardship practices would not provide a substantial change from
the status quo, and it is unclear whether such an uncertain benefit would be
worth the associated costs.
D. Loss of Voting Power
Another, far more drastic, policy proposal calls for restricting passive
funds from voting their shares entirely. 177 Such action would have two primary effects: (1) eliminating the voice of passive investors and (2) thereby
increasing the voice of remaining shareholders.178 Though such a proposition
would of course successfully reduce the voting power of index funds (to
zero), it would produce a number of deleterious consequences. First, such
action would disenfranchise a huge swath of investors, undermining the
shareholder franchise itself—the “ideological underpinning” of corporate
law. 179 If, as predicted, passive investing overtakes active investing in the
next few years, this would result in the disenfranchisement of the majority of
all equity investors. 180
Second, such action would empower activist investors, hedge funds, and
other potentially short-term-oriented investors by increasing the impact of
their vote. 181 To the extent the remaining investors have interests adverse to

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
2024).
181.

See Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 21.
See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
See Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 21.
See Lund, supra note 81, at 528–30.
See id. at 529–530.
Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988).
Hunnicutt, supra note 33 (predicting that index funds will hold over half of the market by
Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 21.
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index fund investors, 182 such action would harm index fund investors by definition. 183 Additionally, in comparison to index fund investors who tend to
be more interested in long-term performance and overall economic stability, 184 activist investors, short-term investors, and investors interested in extracting private benefits are more likely to have interests adverse to longterm, sustainable economic growth. 185 In this way, eliminating the vote for
index fund investors could also have negative consequences for both longterm shareholders and society as a whole.
Third, as Professors Marcel Kahn and Edward Rock note, no shareholder has pure incentives or zero conflicts of interest. 186 To the extent that
these conflicts vary, diversity of shareholders involved in the voting process
can help to balance and thereby limit the effects of impure motives on actual
outcomes. Reducing this balance and increasing the power of the remaining
shareholders would increase the vulnerability of corporations to these weaknesses of the remaining shareholders, perhaps strengthening conflicts of interest or increasing the ability of shareholders with imperfect incentives to
act on those incentives. 187
Fourth, such a move would distort the relationship between voting control and share ownership, increasing the voting power of non-indexed stocks
without increasing their share ownership. Such a change could have unforeseen consequences on the behavior of investors, corporations, and the market

182. See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60
STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1258 (2008) (contrasting the short-term focus of hedge funds with the interests
of index funds and individual investors); Anabtawi, supra note 101, at 564 (describing the potential
for hedge fund activists to promote short-term ends at the expense of long-term benefits); Brian J.
Bushee, The Influence of Institutional Investors on Myopic R&D Investment Behavior, 73 ACCT.
REV. 305, 330 (1998) (providing evidence that investors can influence the degree to which corporations invest in the long-term in harmful ways); Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial
Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, 269 (2012) (discussing harms of shorttermist thinking); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1083 (2007) (labeling hedge funds the “archetypal
short-term investor”).
183. See Strine, supra note 70, at 1923 (discussing how it is already true that “the most vocal
and powerful of the electorate will be those with investment horizons the least aligned with human
investors” and that hedge funds and actively managed funds are currently determining outcomes
that do not match the interests of human investors).
184. Id.at 1967 (describing index fund investors as “uniquely long-term and committed to sustainable wealth creation.”).
185. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 21 (noting that were
such a policy to be implement, some remaining shareholders “would have distinct personal interests
in control” and that such a policy could “creat[e] the temptation to extract private benefits and in
any event providing a windfall without apparent gains to shareholders or society as a whole”).
186. Kahan & Rock, supra note 146, at 7.
187. Id. at 55 (stating “conflicts of interests are endogenous to the legal system and a change in
voting rules is likely to cause shareholders [to] gain more voting power to develop stronger conflicts”).

2020]

WE THREE KINGS

983

in general by significantly recalibrating the relationship between investors,
proxy voting, and firm behavior. 188 These unforeseen consequences may
produce market shocks or other undesirable disruptions.
E. Dilution of Voting Power
A more constrained version of the prior proposal might entail reducing
the weight of votes wielded by index funds, perhaps to half or a quarter of a
standard vote. Though this approach would be more muted than eliminating
index fund franchise altogether, it would have similar negative costs in terms
of empowering other shareholders and reducing the voice of a substantial
subset of investors. Indeed, dilution would merely shift power between index
fund managers and other players rather than addressing the disconnect between the preferences of individual investors and the ways in which index
funds vote.
Professor Dorothy Lund suggests such dilution might also be achieved
by instituting pass-through voting, either uniformly or as a default rule. 189
This pass-through voting would mean that the votes on non-routine matters
would be decided by the individual investors themselves, unless such investors opt out under a default regime. 190 On its face, such a proposal appears
to give the opportunity for individual investors to promote their own interests
in voting decisions. However, Professor Lund cites as a key advantage of
such an approach the fact that individual investors would be unlikely to actually vote their shares, as they would be rationally apathetic to vote outcomes due to the large burdens of voting their shares and the minimal benefits
that would accrue to them given their relatively small levels of investment. 191
Because pass-through voting does not provide individual investors with a
way to consolidate their voting decisions, it is unlikely to overcome rational
apathy and would instead result in a similar outcome to eliminating voting
for index funds entirely. 192 As such, instead of increasing the power of individual human investors to shape corporate decisionmaking, such an approach
would actually diminish their power, since the benefits of expressing their
preferences in such a granular fashion would likely be too small to warrant
the effort.

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 21.
Lund, supra note 81, at 530–31.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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F. Ownership Caps
Another proposal to mitigate problems associated with the rise of index
funds is to implement firm-level or industry-level ownership caps that would
specify investment levels that a given index fund could not exceed.193 Like
voting limits, such ownership caps would dilute the power of a given index
fund provider, preventing it from exerting too much power over a given company. By reducing each index fund’s power, these limits might also reduce
opportunities for self-dealing by index fund agents.
However, this policy suggestion also has a number of key limitations.
First, it would be difficult for regulators to determine the ownership threshold
that accords index funds with sufficient but not excessive power. Second,
ownership in proportion to the broader index is the very strategy index funds
use in their investment approach. Forcing artificial limits on investment
could have the perverse outcome of eliminating true indexing and replacing
it with a distorted cousin, potentially compromising the financial wellbeing
of index fund investors. 194 Third, to the extent that index fund providers continue to share similar priorities and voting preferences,195 industry-level ownership caps would not significantly change the way in which shares are voted.
If not paired with percentage-based caps, industry-level caps might actually
result in each of the Big Three exerting greater control over the artificially
limited number of companies in which they were allowed to invest. Fourth,
such a move would do little to address other problems, agency costs, the way
in which shares are voted, and the disconnect between the preferences of an
individual investor and a given index fund provider. Fifth, if the policy distorted the market for index fund services, such a move could raise fees at
index funds and thereby harm the financial situation of index fund investors.
Though these price increases might be small in scale, the philosophy of index
fund investing is predicated in part on the harmful effect of high fees, an
effect which is compounded over time. 196 Given these costs, it is unclear
whether such an approach would ultimately be beneficial.

193. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 21–22; see also
Bogle, supra note 20.
194. Bogle, supra note 20 (stating in relation to industry ownership caps that “such a drastic
change would lead to the destruction of today’s S&P 500 index fund, by common agreement, the
most beneficial innovation for investors of the modern age”).
195. See supra notes 82–86 and accompanying text.
196. See Bogle, supra note 10.
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G. Structural Limits
Another policy suggestion is to limit the power in the hands of index
fund agents by placing structural limits on index fund providers. 197 One approach would involve limiting index fund providers’ power by constraining
the activities such entities were permitted to do, such as requiring index fund
providers to only market and manage index funds and not other investment
vehicles like actively-managed mutual funds. 198
This approach would reduce the power wielded by index funds and
thereby decrease the concentration of power in the hands of index fund providers, as many index fund providers vote the shares from actively and passively managed funds as a block. 199 It would have the additional benefit of
focusing index fund providers on serving the needs of index fund investors
only, which might better align their incentives with those of their principals
and would thereby reduce potential conflicts of interest.
However, voting decisions would still reflect the priorities of the set of
agents involved in the decisionmaking and not necessarily the actual preferences and interests of the investors themselves. Second, these structural limits might make it more difficult for index fund investors to shift their investments from index funds to actively managed funds, potentially diminishing
competitive pressures on index funds by making the exit options more logistically difficult. 200
Another approach would be to promote structural division of authority,
perhaps dividing voting power for different issue areas to different team
members, giving certain employees control over just a single channel of influence, or giving individuals voting control for just a subset of votes.201 This
approach would reduce the overall power wielded by individual index fund
employees, which would reduce opportunities or incentives for self-dealing
behaviors. Additionally, to the extent that this approach subdivided the votes
for individual index funds or sets of index funds, this approach might also

197. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 22.
198. Id. at 22–23.
199. Strine, supra note 70, at 1913–14 (“If you are a rational index fund investor and your fund
will not exit until the portfolio stock leaves the index, you will find you get no independent thinking
at all or any separate voice. Rather, your index fund will vote the same way as the actively traded
funds in the fund complex, regardless of the fact that the active funds do not hold long term, and
regardless of key factors such as whether the issue on the table is a stock-for-stock merger in which
the index fund holds both the acquirer and the target.” (footnotes omitted)).
200. See Fisch et al., supra note 48, at 5 (arguing that “investors in index funds can exit at any
time by selling their shares and . . . receiving the net asset value of their ownership interest.”); Kahan
& Rock, supra note 146, at 13 (noting that “investors find it substantially easier to move funds
within a mutual fund family than between mutual fund families”). This exit option causes mutual
funds–active and passive–to compete for investors both on price and performance.
201. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 22.
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diversify the courses of action taken by index fund agents. Indeed, such differentiation in voting behavior can be seen at Fidelity, where individual fund
managers make voting decisions rather than a centralized team. 202 Fidelity
funds exhibit internal disagreement in 3144 per 100,000 votes, 542 times
more often than funds at Vanguard, 175 times more often than funds at
BlackRock, and 16 times more often than funds at State Street. 203
However, there are some limitations to this approach as well. Like the
former version of structural limits, this approach also does not promote
awareness of, or attention to, the actual interests and perspectives of index
fund investors. Second, to the extent that this approach increases costs by
complicating investment stewardship, index fund investors would have to
pay higher fees for investment services. Third, the division of power might
blunt the ability of index fund providers to wield their power effectively, potentially to the disservice of index fund investors. Finally, to the extent that
the employees of Vanguard, BlackRock, State Street, and other such funds
are committed to similar principles of corporate governance (and to hiring
individuals with similar values), such a policy may not lead to as high a level
of differentiation as has been seen at Fidelity.
H. Antitrust
An additional way to limit the power of index funds is via antitrust responses. One such proposal would limit the ability of index funds to control
multiple companies in a given industry, particularly in industries that are of
“competitive concern” due to market concentration.204 Such an approach,
particularly if limited to areas of true concern and if well-applied, could have
the benefit of redressing anticompetitive effects some believe are associated
with the rise of indexing. 205
However, there would be negative implications to this proposal as well.
Like ownership caps, industry caps would limit the ability of index funds to
accurately mimic indices of the broader market in a way that could harm index fund investors and their portfolios. Second, index funds might be forced
to select one competitor in a given industry despite its proportional size in
the actual index. Such competitors would be induced to compete for index
fund providers’ investment in their particular firm. As a result, this approach
might inadvertently strengthen the power and influence of index funds over
firms’ behaviors in concentrated industries. Third, it is not clear if there is

202.
203.
204.
205.

Fichtner et al., supra note 3, at 316–17.
Id. at 317.
Posner et al., supra note 41, at 696–98.
See supra notes 155–159 and accompanying text.
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enough heterogeneity among fund providers’ incentives and corporate governance philosophies in order to produce real change in this area. Under the
status quo, the Big Three tend to share similar priorities and have similar
corporate governance philosophies, suggesting that the anticipated benefits
from limiting ownership of any one index fund provider to one competitor in
a given industry might be limited. The goal of this approach could be undermined if the multiple index fund providers each controlling a competitor
merely imposed the same corporate governance practices in vogue before.
Fourth, it might be exceedingly difficult for regulators or commentators to
meaningfully define an “industry” and to define the threshold levels of concentration in a given market—the impact of such a change would vary substantially based on the breadth of this definition.206 As such, this proposal
might be difficult to implement well. Altogether, this proposal might have
the benefit of addressing concerns about anticompetitive effects due to the
increasing power of index funds; however, the side effects, including logistical difficulties, uncertain benefits, and negative impacts on index funds investors themselves, might render this approach undesirable.
I. Policing Conflicts of Interest
An additional proposal involves efforts to limit conflicts of interest. For
example, compliance officers could regularly report on potential or actual
conflicts of interest and the measures taken to address these conflicts. 207 Efforts to curb conflicts of interest would have the potential to increase the independence of index fund corporate governance teams. To the extent that
compliance with these requirements increases burdens on index fund providers, such efforts would be likely to slightly raise the fees for index funds to
defray the accompanying costs.
Though these efforts might be a useful way to reduce conflicts of interest, some efforts to manage conflicts of interest are already underway at the
Big Three index fund providers, calling into question whether additional efforts would significantly change the status quo. For example, Vanguard intentionally separates power between individuals charged with voting decisions and those whose duties include external client relationship management
or sales. 208 In addition, Vanguard provides training on conflicts of interest,
requires employees to recuse themselves when conflicts of interest do exist,
has a Conflicts of Interest Policy, and maintains a Conflicts Register. 209
206. Bogle, supra note 20 (referring to the “the dubious ability of either academia or federal
bureaucrats to define precisely what constitutes a given industry”).
207. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 22–23.
208. VANGUARD INVESTMENT GROUP, STEWARDSHIP POLICY (2016), https://global.vanguard.com/documents/stewardship-policy.pdf.
209. Id.
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BlackRock, for its part, also has policies and procedures set in place to counter potential conflicts of interest, including relying upon an independent fiduciary to vote on behalf of clients when necessary. 210 Likewise, State Street
takes considerable efforts to reduce potential conflicts of interest. These efforts include vesting sole voting discretion to members of the Asset Stewardship team, requiring mandatory disclosure of potential conflicts of interest,
utilizing a Proxy Review Committee to oversee the stewardship team and to
manage potential and actual conflicts of interest, and outsourcing voting decisions when necessary. 211 Given these considerable efforts at the largest
index fund providers, it may be redundant to pursue additional efforts to mitigate potential conflicts of interest. At the most, these efforts would represent
only a moderate change to the status quo, and they would be unlikely to address concerns about concentration of power, lack of homogeneity in recommendations, and lack of attention to individual investors’ actual preferences.
J. Regulation of Engagements
An additional proposal would take steps to regulate or eliminate engagements between index fund providers and portfolio companies. 212 Regulating
engagements could involve placing limits on which index fund employees
could participate in engagements, on the content or nature of these discussions, or on how these interactions are reported to the public, while eliminating engagements would involve an outright ban on these activities with accompanying monitoring to ensure compliance. 213
Efforts to constrain and control engagements might reduce the potential
for abuse of power by index fund employees, since these channels of communication are not currently directly monitored. Additionally, to the extent
that these measures involve disclosure, they would give investors more information about how index fund providers are acting on their behalf, which
could give them more power to encourage best practices and limit misconduct.
However, index fund providers do already provide some information on
engagements to their clients and the public at large, including overall statistics and case study examples. 214 Additionally, it is possible that these efforts
210. BLACKROCK
,
BLACKROCK
INVESTMENT
STEWARDSHIP
(2020),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-profile-of-blackrock-investmentstewardship-team-work.pdf.
211. STATE STREET GLOBAL ADVISORS, 2019 SSGA CONFLICT MITIGATION GUIDELINES
(2019),
https://www.ssga.com/library-content/pdfs/ic/2019-ssga-conflict-mitigation-guidelines.pdf.
212. See Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 22–23.
213. Id.
214. See, e.g., VANGUARD INVESTMENT GROUP, supra note 53, at 11–30 (providing twenty
pages of information and case study data on engagement activities); BLACKROCK, supra note 53,
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to minimize engagements could simply result in a shift from engagements to
less direct forms of communication, such as publishing more detailed voting
guidelines or engaging with popular media to express concerns about a particular company or practice. In this way, these efforts may not produce a
significantly different outcome than the status quo.
K. Insufficiency of Current Proposals
These solutions individually and in combination have the potential to
remedy some concrete problems associated with the rise in index fund ownership, including concentration of power, anticompetitive effects, potential
for abuse of power by index fund agents, conflicts of interest, and insufficient
transparency. However, none of the above proposals successfully mitigates
one key problem: the disconnect between how index funds vote their shares
and the actual preferences and interests of their individual investors. Some
proposals, including those involving dilution or elimination of voting for index funds, would only deepen the disconnect between the interests of index
fund investors and corporate decisionmaking. To the extent that we view
shareholder franchise as a valuable exercise, insulating or totally excluding
actual investors from the decision-making process subverts the fundamental
goals of shareholder democracy. 215 The following Part sets out a proposal
that would both mitigate some concerns about the rising power of index funds
and would give individual investors themselves the opportunity to influence
how that power is wielded.
VII. AN ALTERNATE APPROACH
“Human investors,” the individuals investing in the stock market for retirement or other long-term goals, have long been characterized as “rationally
apathetic” about corporate governance decisions. 216 Even though their investments may represent a large portion of their life savings, their holdings
in a given company tend to be so small that their vote has minimal impact on

at 7–21; STATE STREET GLOBAL ADVISORS, supra note 53, at 48–99 (providing data, statistics, and
case study information on engagement efforts).
215. See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988) (“The shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power
rests.”).
216. See supra Section III.A; see also Bainbridge, supra note 101, at 558 (“[M]ost shareholders
are rationally apathetic. A rational shareholder will expend the effort necessary to make informed
decisions only if the expected benefits of doing so outweigh its costs. Given the length and complexity of corporate disclosure documents, the opportunity cost entailed in making informed decisions is both high and apparent. In contrast, the expected benefits of becoming informed are quite
low, as most shareholders’ holdings are too small to have significant effect on the outcome of shareholder votes.” (footnotes omitted)).
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the outcome of a shareholder vote. 217 As a consequence, the value of conducting research on ballot items or engaging with boards of directors is far
offset by the costs of such activities, meaning that the typical human investor
is better off choosing not to exercise his or her voting rights. 218 This rational
apathy manifests itself in actual voting behavior: Only 28% of shares held by
individual investors were voted at annual meetings in 2019. 219
Index funds, however, represent an opportunity for this rational apathy
to be transformed into rational involvement. This is because index funds
already employ a team of corporate governance experts and proxy advisory
firms to engage in research and to perform the actual voting in the many
shareholder meetings on behalf of the ordinary humans that invest in index
funds. These funds are in turn supported by considerable infrastructure and
proxy advisory services that permit index fund providers to automate voting
decisions according to a set of voting guidelines. Though it is irrational for
these individual index fund investors to replicate such efforts, it is not irrational for these investors to express their general preferences to existing corporate governance teams, particularly if doing so can be done efficiently.
Priority setting can take various forms, which will be discussed below.
However, the common element to all of these approaches is an infrequent
expression of generalized priorities or preferences, which would be used to
guide index fund representatives in casting votes on behalf of the index fund.
A. Options for Involving Index Fund Investors
This Section provides recommended solutions for increased involvement of individual investors in stewardship decisions. Under these reforms,
index fund providers would (1) give individual investors the option to have
the proxy votes corresponding to their ownership shares voted according to
the recommendations of a investor-chosen representative (“indirect democracy”); (2) solicit input from individual investors on their preferences, interests, and values via a survey or poll (“informed discretion”); (3) permit voting
rights to pass-through to individual investors who would be able to craft
standing voting instructions on common ballot items (“pass-through voting
instructions”); or, ideally, (4) use all three of above methods in combination,
based upon investors’ intensity of preference and the nature of the ballot item.

217. Id.; see also Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, In Search of the “Absent” Shareholders: A New
Solution to Retail Investors’ Apathy, 41 Del. J. Corp. L. 55, 60–61 (2016).
218. Kastiel & Nili, supra note 217, at 60–61.
219. PROXYPULSE, supra note 46.
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1. Indirect Democracy
One approach to involving human investors in the voting process would
be to permit investors to select a representative that they desire to determine
voting decisions. 220 For example, human investors could express a preference to have the votes corresponding to their ownership cast according to the
index fund provider’s recommendations, according to a given proxy advisory
company’s recommendations, according to the board’s recommendations, in
accordance with another institutional investor, proportionally in line with
other investors in the fund, or to abstain from voting altogether. 221 Alternatively, they might have the option to choose between a menu of different
proxy advisory services—indeed, additional demand for more tailored proxy
advisory services could spur new entry into this space, providing muchneeded competition in a sector dominated by only two firms. 222 The selection
of a representative would be expressed at an infrequent interval, perhaps annually or biennially.
When making this decision, investors could be offered information and
resources about how these various groups tend to vote, the voting guidelines
220. This model was pioneered by private third-party service providers such as Moxy Vote.
However, Moxy Vote and others are now defunct, in part due to the cost and complexity of complying with burdensome proxy solicitation requirements. See Ross Kerber, Shareholder Website
Closing, Cites Complex Voting Rules, REUTERS (July 10, 2012, 6:33 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/moxyvote-shutdown/shareholder-website-closing-cites-complex-voting-rulesidUSL2E8IA8XU20120710. This Article posits that, because funds are legally voting their own
proxies rather than those of “ultimate investors,” a similar approach in the context of index
fund/ETF voting would have reduced complexity and a greater likelihood of success.
221. Steve Norman, former Corporate Secretary of American Express, proposed a similar approach to harnessing retail investors’ votes as a part of the New York Stock Exchange’s 2005 Proxy
Working Group. He suggested that retail shareholders be given four options, including that their
votes (1) be cast in favor the board’s recommendation, (2) be case against the board’s recommendation, (3) not be voted, or (4) be voted proportionally with the votes of other retail investors. See
Fisch, supra note 149, at 30. Similarly, Professors Kobi Kastiel and Yaron Nili proposed permitting
retail investors to select from a menu of options for casting their votes, including (1) the option to
vote with management, (2) the option to vote according to the recommendations of proxy advisors,
(3) the option to vote with the majority of shareholders (which might be calculated with or without
managements’ shares), and (4) the option to abstain from voting. Kastiel & Nili, supra note 217, at
88. Because institutional investors already have systems in place to centralize voting decisions and
because there are fewer legal hurdles to involving individual investors in the voting process at the
index fund level, it may be substantially easier to implement these types of policies in the context
of index fund investors. See infra Section VII.C. Additionally, given the decline of retail investing
and corresponding growth of index funds, providing these options at the index fund level may be a
more effective way to involve human investors in the voting process. See Brian G. Cartwright, Gen.
Counsel, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address at the University of Pennsylvania Law School Institute
for Law and Economics: The Future of Securities Regulation (Oct. 24, 2007) (transcript available
at http://sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch102407bgc.htm) (“[O]ver the last half century direct stock
ownership by U.S. retail investors has been in an on-going decline relative to ownership by institutions. Institutional ownership used to be almost irrelevant. Now, retail ownership seems to be
headed in that direction.”).
222. Tingle, supra note 94, at 743.
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crafted by these groups, and/or data on the impact that these groups have had
on corporate decisionmaking or share price. Individual investors could also
decide to seek advice on their decision from corporate governance experts or
financial advisors, whether paid or unpaid. Since the decision would be infrequent and impactful, seeking paid guidance on the choice of representation
for this “indirect democracy” option would be far more financially feasible
than doing so for individual companies or individual ballot items. Additionally, individual investors might also opt to pursue independent research on
these entities, perhaps availing themselves of resources provided by the entities themselves, the index fund provider, corporate law scholars, economists,
or others with relevant expertise.
To be sure, such a policy would not offer human investors infinite
choices and may force them into small boxes that imperfectly represent their
actual needs and interests. However, even this level of involvement in decisionmaking would harness their perspectives on corporate governance to a
greater degree than the status quo. Moreover, were such a policy to be implemented, it seems likely that the various entities involved would seek to
distinguish themselves on matters of corporate governance and call attention
to their differences, thereby further increasing the true choices available to
human investors. Such an approach might also encourage competition between index fund providers, proxy advisors, and related entities, providing
the opportunity for superior approaches to corporate governance to be identified and rewarded.
2. Informed Discretion
A second way that individual human investors could be involved in
shaping the voting decisions made by index funds is through expressing their
individual circumstances and values in an annual or even quinquennial survey. 223 In these surveys, individual human investors would be asked to provide relevant information about their financial circumstances and investment
priorities, such as their time horizon for investment, their wealth class, their
risk tolerance level, their spending habits, and their age. Investors could also
be given the opportunity to express their values regarding political, environmental, social, and labor issues. This data would then be shared with corporate governance teams at a given index fund provider (or their chosen proxy
advisory firms), who would be tasked with utilizing this information in shaping voting decisions. 224 Because of the vast scale of index funds and the
223. In this vein, some have proposed that funds would poll a representative sample of their
investors to gauge investors preference on key issues, such as social responsibility resolutions. See
Scott Hirst, Social Responsibility Resolutions, 43 J. CORP. L. 217, 238 (2018).
224. If these changes are not taken up at the fund level, other market actors may generate their
own “feedback mechanisms” to facilitate the expression of their values. See Letter from John C.
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concentration of voting power in centralized corporate governance teams,
this information could be aggregated and grouped, simplifying the burden on
index fund management while still ensuring that due consideration is given
to the unique situations of actual human investors.
There are a number of voting decisions that might be better made by
agents with some sense of the unique situation of their individual investors.
For example, investors with a long time horizon for investment may be more
likely to favor significant investment in research and development. 225 Some
investors might be passionately committed to promoting environmental sustainability, human rights, fair labor practices, religious values, or other social
goals (either alone or in combination) and desire for index fund providers to
advocate for these outcomes on their behalf. 226 Investors of modest means
who spend a significant portion of their income on household goods might
be wary of mergers that might induce price increases, while wealthier investors with substantial portfolios would be more likely to benefit from such
mergers even in the face of price increases. 227 When considering questions
such as these, data on investor composition and values would aid index funds
in promoting the actual interests and desires of their shareholders.
A potential shortcoming of this approach is that it necessitates giving
considerable discretion to index fund representatives in interpreting how the
characteristics and priorities of individual investors should translate into actual votes. Nonetheless, this approach offers many advantages in comparison
to the status quo. First, as numerous scholars have argued, 228 shareholders
have diverse characteristics and priorities that ought to be reflected in how
companies are managed, and attention to these diverse characteristics is a
vital first step in ensuring that they are translated into how corporations are
managed. Second, by virtue of increasing accountability of index funds to
Wilcox, Chairman, Morrow Sodali Global LLC, to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n (Dec. 28, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/comments/4-725/4725-4840503-177168.pdf (stating that concerns such as “(i) concentration and common ownership of stocks by index funds; and
(ii) the exercise of voting power by ETFs without reference to the views of ultimate owners in
managed accounts . . . combined with the growing popularity of collective investment vehicles will
sooner or later give rise to private sector mechanisms for informal pass-through referendums on
ETF’s and indexers’ voting policies.”).
225. See Eric M. Fogel & Andrew M. Geier, Strangers in the House: Rethinking SarbanesOxley and the Independent Board of Directors, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33, 61 (2007) (“Longer-term
investors are interested in the redeployment of capital for research and development to generate
profits tomorrow.”).
226. See, e.g., HUNG-GAY FUNG ET AL., SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT IN A GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENT 5 (2010) (describing shareholder engagers and activists who endeavor to utilize their
influence to promote social ends).
227. See Griffin, supra note 157.
228. See, e.g., Orts, supra note 101, at 1591 (arguing for recognition and consideration of shareholders’ diverse and potentially conflicting interests); Stout, supra note 101, at 174 (noting that
shareholders have diverse interests).
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the actual perspectives of their shareholders, such a policy reduces the power
of index fund managers. Third, this approach would likely entail greater deviation in how index funds vote the shares under their control, reducing the
overall power of index funds to determine voting outcomes and better aligning the votes with the actual traits and preferences of investors. Fourth, this
approach has the potential to diversify the approaches taken by index funds
and to allow them to compete on how they exercise their control, giving more
options to investors and creating competitive pressure towards optimal corporate governance.
3. Pass-Through Voting Instructions
A third way in which index funds could involve human investors in the
decision-making process is to enable them to express a preference for how to
tackle the key issues in corporate governance in the form of pass-through
voting instructions. 229 These voting instructions could be selected once when
an account with the fund provider was opened, with an annual option to update preferences or to leave them as before. Investors could also be given the
option to defer to other agents, such as an index fund provider, proxy advisor,
portfolio company management, or another institutional investor, on most
questions, but to select a few individual questions about which they desire to
express their preferences more directly. These preferences could vary in
specificity, but the basic goal would be to give investors greater voice regarding the way index funds vote their shares. For example, a relatively simple
survey might ask whether the individual investor would prefer to have the
funds’ votes cast in support or in opposition to a merger where the fund only
229. Other scholars have proposed a similar approach in the context of retail investors. See,
e.g., Fisch, supra note 149, at 45 (proposing the implementation of standardized voting instructions
that would “allow [retail] investors to designate issue-specific voting policies or guidelines, such as
voting against classified boards, in favor of separating the chair and CEO, or against overboarded
directors. . . . An even more complex menu might enable investors to set up screens which would
operate to direct the investors’ vote in accordance with specified criteria—such as voting in accordance with management recommendations unless the screen flags a problem like underperformance
or poor corporate governance”); Kastiel & Nili, supra note 217, at 90 (proposing that retail shareholders could have the option to select “a different short-cut for each type of questions that are
brought for a shareholder vote”). There are several factors which suggest that this proposal might
be more effectively implemented in the index fund context, including existing infrastructure at index
fund provider companies to support such a policy and fewer legal hurdles to soliciting this information from investors since index fund investors do not legally have proxies to solicit. See infra
Section VII.C. Additionally, as more and more human investors transition to index fund investing,
the index fund context may be a more efficient route for involving large numbers of individual
investors in the voting process. See Cartwright supra note 221. There has recently been growing
interest in providing “pass-through voting” functionality for mutual fund and ETF investors. See
generally, Letter from John C. Wilcox to Brent J. Fields, supra note 224 (“A case can be made that
investors who delegate stock picking and proxy voting decisions to third-party professionals, while
having no standing to vote at shareholder meetings, should have some means to voluntarily inform
their fiduciaries about their views on issues affecting their investments.”).
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owned shares of the acquirer, unless the fund provider had a compelling reason to vote otherwise. 230 A more detailed survey might ask the following
question:
In a merger where you own shares only of the acquirer, you would
desire the funds’ shares:
(a) to always be voted to approve the merger,
(b) to always be voted to oppose the merger,
(c) to be voted to oppose the merger unless there was compelling
evidence of unique circumstances making increased returns more
likely than average,
(d) to be voted according to management’s recommendations,
(e) to be voted according to [a given proxy advisor]’s recommendations,
(f) to be voted according to the stewardship team’s recommendations,
(g) to be voted in proportion to the survey results from all other
index fund shareholders, or
(h) not be voted.
In either survey form, shareholders could be provided with basic information or articles that summarize the debates over these issues, including the
positions of both sides and various pros and cons. These summaries might
be written by independent advisors, proxy advisors, academics, or other experts. These brief articles could also include links to longer papers and studies for investors interested in more information. Additionally, individual investors would also have the option of doing their own research into these
topics and discussing these matters with financial advisors or other experts
before making any decisions.
Overall, this process would allow individual investors to express their
actual views on key corporate governance issues, giving them greater voice
on matters that are likely relevant to their financial interests and to their personal values and beliefs. Deferring to investors on these issues would have
the benefit of diversifying the pool of decisionmakers charged with tackling
these important questions. It would also significantly blunt the power of index fund agents, since they would be constrained by the preferences of their
investors. To the extent that voters express conflicting preferences, such a
policy might also reduce the power of index fund providers as a whole, since
they might have to divide their influence in support of opposite ends.

230. If past investors had chosen to vote “no” on all mergers in which they held shares only in
the acquirer, there is evidence to suggest that they would have obtained superior returns. See, e.g.,
Anup Agrawal et al., The Post-Merger Performance of Acquiring Firms: A Reexamination of an
Anomaly, 47 J. FIN. 1605, 1605 (1992) (finding “acquiring firms suffer a statistically significant loss
of about 10% over the five-year post-merger period”). It is plausible to think that such information
could change investor voting preferences.
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On the negative side, however, this option is the most likely to impact
the prices of index fund services, since it might be more burdensome to implement the views expressed by individual investors. However, given the
existing infrastructure to support automated voting according to voting
guidelines and the economies of scale enjoyed by index fund providers and
other institutional investors, such price effects are likely to be insignificant at
a per-investor level. 231 Additionally, such a policy could reduce the efforts
index fund providers must expend to research and set priorities on their own,
since investors would be involved in the priority setting (and thereby would
provide the fund with valuable data as to overall investor preferences). This
might help offset any accompanying costs. Finally, some investors may be
happy to pay slightly higher fees (perhaps a few basis points) to have a say
in voting at the companies in which they are ultimately invested. As competing with the Big Three based on fees is difficult due to their scale, competition on something other than fees (i.e., pass-through voting functionality)
could spur welcome new entrants into the index fund space.
4. A Hybrid Approach
Given the heterogeneity of index fund investors, the ideal approach to
soliciting investor input would combine all three approaches described
above. Under such a hybrid approach, all mutual fund investors would have
the right to issue pass-through voting instructions on ten to twenty of the most
salient issues, and those with the highest intensity of preference would do so.
Those with lower intensity of preference could either utilize the “indirect democracy” method of selecting an actor whose votes they would mirror, or
they could choose to have the fund vote on their behalf. If they chose the
latter, rather than guessing at their investors’ views on shareholder resolutions, funds would poll their investors to inform their voting decisions. Combining all three approaches in this tiered manner would ensure that all index
fund investors would have an opportunity to express their preferences in a
manner suited to their situation.
B. Potential Benefits of Deference to Index Fund Investors
Increased deference to investors entails a number of benefits for investors and society at large. These include (1) reduced concentration of power,
(2) increased heterogeneity in decisionmaking, (3) increased alignment between funds’ voting behaviors and index fund investors’ interests, (4) decreased rational apathy, and (5) improved incentives for good corporate governance. This Section explores these benefits in greater detail.

231. See infra Section VII.C.
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1. Reduced Concentration of Power
At a general level, a policy involving some degree of deference to the
actual preferences of human investors would entail numerous benefits. First,
by giving index fund investors some influence over voting decisions, such a
policy would spread decision-making power to a larger group of individuals.
This would reduce the concentration of power in the hands of index fund
providers, in-house corporate governance divisions, individual index fund
provider employees, and proxy advisors. This would take proposals to spread
index funds’ power across more index fund employees several steps further,
spreading that power to potentially millions of index fund investors rather
than a few dozen index fund employees.
2. Increased Heterogeneity in Decisionmaking
Deference to individual investors would diversify the pool of decisionmakers, including the voices of segments of society who currently have
little voice in corporate decisionmaking. Additionally, to the extent that these
individual investors have diverse interests, such a policy also has the potential
to increase the heterogeneity of voting priorities and voting guidelines at the
fund level, index fund provider level, or both. This could result in increased
differentiation between funds, proxy advisors, and index fund providers on
matters of corporate governance, potentially providing the opportunity for
optimal corporate governance practices to competitively emerge. While currently index funds are “essentially commodities,” 232 such differentiation
would reduce the interchangeability of index funds and spur competition on
factors other than fees. 233 Like competition in any market, competition in the
market for voting control would have the benefit of increasing incentives for
good corporate governance and would create greater opportunities for good
corporate governance practices to be attempted, identified, recognized, and
rewarded.
3. Increased Alignment with Index Fund Investors’ Interests
Third, such a policy would better align the preferences and priorities of
actual human investors with the voting behaviors of index fund providers.
Such an outcome would give voice to the interests of the actual owners of
index funds, i.e., the principals in this agency relationship, whose interests
should be paramount. Fund managers have a fiduciary duty to ensure that

232. Kahan & Rock, supra note 146, at 12, 51.
233. Id. at 51 (stating that ESG issues “could also be justified as effective marketing . . . a form
of non-price competition designed to attract investments into what has become a commodity”).
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the funds’ shares are voted in their investors’ best interests, 234 and allowing
investors to express their own interests is almost certainly more accurate than
allowing a small, centralized corporate governance committee to attempt to
discern those interests independently. 235 Additionally, because index fund
investors are uniquely interested in long-term, sustainable economic growth
and stability, advancement of their interests has the potential to benefit society as whole. 236
4. Decreased Rational Apathy
Fourth, such a policy would help overcome the rational apathy of individual investors, since an infrequent expression of voting preferences would
be a far briefer and less onerous activity than deciding how to vote on individual ballot items. 237 This would reduce the potential for index funds to be
passive players in the corporate governance arena. Additionally, by countering rational apathy, this policy would efficiently harness index fund investors’ incentives. After all, rational apathy does not mean that these investors
have no interest in good corporate governance but rather that expressing their
preferences is too burdensome. By reducing obstacles to involvement and
allowing investors to provide broad answers to types of questions rather than
the thousands of granular questions themselves, this policy would harness
index fund investors’ incentives to promote good corporate governance and
put them to more efficient use.
Further, as a normative matter, including the heterogenous views of
such investors legitimizes shareholder democracy. Even if a significant portion of investors fail to exercise this power, at least they will do so by choice.
Simply because many, or even most, investors would be rationally apathetic
should not be cause for denying direct participating in the franchise for all
others. 238

234. Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management
Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8188, Exchange Act Release No. 47,304, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,922, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564, 6580 (Jan. 31, 2003) (referring to
the “fiduciary duties to vote proxies of portfolio securities in the best interest of fund shareholders”).
235. See generally, F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519,
524 (1945).
236. Strine, supra note 70, at 1967.
237. Some contend that pass-through voting would increase rational apathy, on the ground that
such voting would require investors to annually consider “thousands of matters.” See Sean J. Griffith, Opt-In Stewardship: Toward an Optimal Delegation of Mutual Fund Voting Authority, 98 Tex.
L. Rev. (forthcoming 2020). However, such a criticism is based upon an overly restricted description of pass-through voting, since index fund investors could instead be asked to express preferences
through generalized pass-through voting instructions (e.g., “Vote against all overboarded directors,”
or “Vote for all climate-related disclosures”), a task that would be far less onerous.
238. See Fisch, supra note 149, at 16 (stating as a normative matter that “voting results should
convey the views of all shareholders”). Although mutual fund investors are owners of shares in the
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5. Improved Incentives for Good Corporate Governance
Fifth, deference to human investors has the potential to better align the
incentives of those wielding power over corporate governance standards with
the outcomes they promote. Prompting index fund investors to go through
the process of answering these questions might make them realize that they
have been voting for things they do not support and are entirely antithetical
to their interests. The act of selecting their preferences may provide valuable
information to principals about the way that their fiduciary is voting, perhaps
making an environmentalist investor realize that their shares have been used
to oppose green initiatives at companies for years. In this way, involving
individual investors in the voting process might make them more aware of
the actions of their agents, more interested in monitoring the behaviors of
those agents, and more vocal in promoting their own interests, which would
provide a beneficial check on index funds’ power. Moreover, if investors are
involved in deciding what constitutes their best interests in some way, then
index fund investors will have a metric that they can use to assess whether or
not index fund providers are adequately pursuing that interest. By giving
investors some check on index fund providers’ power, this approach could
decrease agency costs, encourage transparency, and improve the incentives
of index fund investors.
***
In the ways discussed in the subsections above, it may be possible to use
deference to index fund investors to address some of the key concerns about
the rising power of index funds without resorting to disenfranchising index
funds and their investors and without relying on regulations which might
raise prices for index fund services or promote outcomes not necessarily consistent with index fund investors’ will. 239 By involving the index fund investors themselves in the decision-making process, it could be possible to simultaneously increase alignment of outcomes with index fund investors’ actual
interests, increase competition and diversity in index fund corporate governance, and provide a check on the growing power of index funds and their
managers.
C. Potential Concerns About Deference to Index Fund Investors
Although there are benefits to deferring to index fund investors, a
change to the status quo is only merited if such benefits outweigh associated
costs. This section explores potential costs in greater detail, including: (1)
mutual fund and not the company itself, the fund itself is a fiduciary agent for its investors that is
bound to vote in the investors’, rather than its own, interests.
239. See Kastiel & Nili, supra note 217, at 96.
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the potential that individual investors are “uninformed”, (2) the need for infrastructure to support investor involvement in stewardship activities, (3) the
risk that investor involvement might lead to increased fees for indexed investing, (4) any legal hurdles that might prohibit or restrict investors involvement, (5) the costs associated with both proportional voting and block voting
of investors’ shares and the need to select between the two options, and (6)
implementation challenges.
1. Reliance upon “Uninformed” Judgments
However, there are some potential limitations to deferring to index fund
investors. First, such an approach might inspire fears that involving unsophisticated or uninformed investors in decisionmaking would lead to worse
outcomes. 240 To some extent, these fears might be the byproduct of paternalistic thinking on the part of academics, commentators, or index fund representatives, and, therefore, these fears might be difficult to overcome.
However, a number of features specific to this proposal might mitigate
such concerns. Deference to individual investors could involve providing
these investors with the option to defer to the recommendations of more sophisticated players, such as index fund representatives, proxy advisors, or
firm management, and individual investors could always be given the option
to opt out of expressing their preferences (or instead be required to initially
opt in). Additionally, deference to individual investors would be designed in
such a way that these investors have greater incentive to become informed,
since their involvement would be less burdensome and more efficient, making them far more informed on the questions asked of them than they might
be about the particulars of a single ballot item or a single company. Further,
pass-through voting instructions provide a useful method to gauge the intensity of investors’ preferences. The investment of the time required to participate filters out those apathetic or uninterested investors (who would prefer
to abstain or defer) and gives greater power to interested, better-informed
investors.
Moreover, while some would criticize the average investor as “unsophisticated” or “uniformed,” there is little to support the notion that the opinions of proxy advisors or corporate governance teams on contentious social
and environmental issues, many of which are political in nature, should be
preferred over those of their investors. In fact, there is reason to believe that

240. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate
Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2119 (2019) (stating that
pass-through voting “would likely be based on very little information”); Lund, supra note 81, at 531
(implying that individual index fund investors might engage in uniformed thinking).
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proxy advisors and corporate governance teams do not have any superior expertise in these issues at all. 241 Likewise, there is no obvious consensus on
which corporate governance practices, if any, uniformly produce superior returns. Because of the lack of any special expertise and the lack of a clear
“right answer” to many of the questions at issue in proxy votes, it is difficult
or impossible to say that individual investors would be wrong in their expressed preferences. They may, in fact, pursue economically superior outcomes to existing corporate governance teams, and, at any rate, they would
be more likely to produce the voting outcomes they prefer. The idea that
investors cannot become adequately informed on, say, fifteen broad questions seems to both overly denigrate the intelligence of ordinary investors and
to overly reify the capabilities of index fund stewardship teams to make decisions on social and environmental issues beyond their core expertise.
Additionally, a number of characteristics about individual index fund
investors suggest that the risk of these individuals making unthinking or uninformed judgments might be low. First, index fund investors often place a
significant portion of their life savings in their investments, funds which they
use for major life expenses such as saving for retirement, funding their children’s education, or setting aside an emergency fund.242 Though their investment might seem “small” compared to the size of Vanguard’s holdings or the
net worth of a director, it is likely to be a “large” investment in terms of its
importance to individual investors and their financial future. Because of the
personal importance of these funds, it is likely that individual investors will
either make informed choices, defer to another player, or abstain from expressing an opinion. 243 Second, these individuals are likely to be considerably more diverse than the corporate managers and index fund agents who
represent them. Because they are more representative of America as a whole,
index fund investors are likely to be far more impacted by economic and social externalities of corporate behaviors, meaning these individuals are likely
to be more invested in mitigating externalities and promoting sustainable economic growth. 244 In this way, they are potentially more likely to be affected

241. Griffith, supra note 237, at 1 (“With respect to environmental and social issues, meaningful
information is not produced nor can mutual funds assume a common investor purpose.”).
242. Strine, supra note 70, at 1874.
243. See Fisch, supra note 149, at 44–46.
244. See Strine, supra note 70, at 1879 (describing how “most workers have a substantial interest in the durable appreciation of their portfolio, and do not benefit in any way from stock bubbles
arising from gimmicks or unsustainable strategies because these gains will go away and if those
bubbles result in economic recessions and diminutions in economic growth, the worker will suffer
both at the time of retirement, and perhaps more importantly, during their working careers, as economic slowdowns that result in job losses and wage stagnation threaten their most important source
of wealth”).
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by and informed about negative externalities than other players in corporate
decisionmaking.
2. Infrastructure
An additional concern is how to develop the infrastructure to support
increased deference to investors, whether in the form of indirect democracy,
informed discretion, pass-through voting instructions, or some combination
of the three. Fortunately, however, there already exists substantial infrastructure at index fund providers to support voting. 245 Existing corporate governance teams could be redeployed in an effort to better represent the actual
preferences of index fund investors, and existing relationships with proxy
advisory companies could be altered to provide extra support on research or
voting implementation. Additionally, there are already digital tools in place
that allow index fund providers to cast, manage, and execute ballots via a
digital platform, and these tools could permit index fund investors to automatically vote shares according to their voting guidelines without the need to
engage with each individual contest or ballot item. 246 For example, ISS offers
ProxyExchange, a tool which “simplifies the proxy voting process” by allowing clients to “automate [their] routine tasks” and vote according to standardized voting guidelines. 247 Similarly, Broadridge offers ProxyEdge, a digital
proxy management solution that allows its users to have their votes cast according to “automated voting rules and integrated vote recommendations.” 248
Tools like these could be applied to the task of voting the index funds’ shares
according to the preferences set out by individual shareholders themselves
instead of the preferences determined by index fund teams. Because this
substantial infrastructure exists and is already utilized by index fund providers, the task of incorporating index fund investors’ perspectives would be
considerably less burdensome than it might initially appear.
3. Increased Index Fund Fees
Third, depending on the characteristics of the approach taken, deference
to index fund investors might increase the costs associated with index fund
services. It may be more burdensome and therefore more costly to ascertain
investors’ actual preferences and then implement those preferences, requiring
additional employees or additional support from outside firms such as proxy
advisors.
245. See Fisch, supra note 149, at 39.
246. Id. at 22–23.
247. Proxy Exchange, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, https://www.issgovernance.com/solutions/proxy-voting-services/proxy-exchange/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2020).
248. BROADRIDGE, PROXYEDGE (2018), https://www.broadridge.com/_assets/pdf/broadridgeproxyedge-complete-proxy-management-from-voting-through-reporting.pdf.
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However, given the existing infrastructure at index funds that permits
funds to vote their proxies according to predetermined guidelines, these cost
increases are unlikely to be especially significant at a per-investor level. 249
There may be some minimal costs associated with modifying these existing
tools to support increased investor involvement, and there would be costs
involved in developing the survey and conducting the survey. Considering
the existing infrastructure and the enormous scale of index fund providers, it
seems likely that any incremental cost increases would be relatively modest. 250
4. Potential Legal Impediments
An additional concern centers on whether there are any legal impediments to seeking index fund investors’ input on proxy voting and other related matters. First, there are the potentially burdensome requirements for
proxy solicitations to consider. For example, under section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the SEC requires that all proxy solicitations
must be duly filed unless an applicable exception exists. 251 Likewise, proxy
statements frequently trigger the obligation to furnish shareholders with a
proxy statement. 252 Proxy solicitations are defined as “[t]he furnishing of a
form of proxy or other communication to security holders under circumstances reasonably calculated to result in the procurement, withholding or
revocation of a proxy.” 253 Unlike in the context of retail investors,254 an attempt by index fund providers to learn more about the interests and voting
priorities of their clients very likely would not constitute a proxy solicitation.
This is because the index fund itself is the beneficial owner of all shares controlled by that index fund and therefore retains the right and obligation to

249. See Fisch, supra note 149, at 39 (noting that “institutional investors have access to a variety
of services that simplify the mechanics of proxy voting, including: (1) a centralized Internet platform on which they can access information relating to voting matters for their entire portfolio; (2)
the ability to cast votes through this platform; and (3) the ability to designate voting policies or
preferences, rather than casting votes on an individual, firm-by-firm basis”).
250. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 10 (noting that index
funds benefit from economies of scale when implementing investment stewardship); see Fisch, supra note 149, at 53 (“[S]ome institutional investors, such as Blackrock and Vanguard, devote substantial resources to voting research.”).
251. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2 (2019) (providing that “Sections 240.14a–3 to 240.14a–15, except
as specified, apply to every solicitation of a proxy with respect to securities registered pursuant to
section 12 of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78l), whether or not trading in such securities has been suspended”).
252. See id. § 240.14a-3 (outlining information that must be furnished to shareholders).
253. Id. § 240.14a-1.
254. See Fisch, supra note 149, at 40.
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vote shares. 255 The board of an index fund generally delegates voting authority to an investment advisor, and the board and these investment advisers
have a fiduciary duty “to vote proxies of portfolio securities in the best interest of fund shareholders,” in this case, the index fund investors. 256 Because
of the way that this relationship is structured, seeking input of individual index fund investors about voting priorities and interests would be a way for
index fund providers to better fulfill their fiduciary duties to index fund investors and not a proxy solicitation. This means that the burdensome requirements accompanying proxy solicitations would not apply to this context,
making it considerably easier in this respect to involve index fund investors
in the decision-making process as compared to retail investors. 257
An additional potential legal hurdle is Rule 14(a)-4(d). This rule restricts the time in which a proxy can confer voting authority, prohibiting conference of authority “with respect to more than one meeting” or for “any annual meeting other than the next annual meeting.” 258 Again, these time
limitations do not apply in the index fund context due to the structure of mutual funds and the fact that the mutual fund itself retains the right to vote the
funds’ proxies.
Still, these provisions likely reflect a more general concern by regulators
that allowing investors to preemptively express preferences on how they
would like to vote would encourage uninformed, generic voting. 259 Despite
these fears, the proposals suggested here would not be a change from the
status quo in terms of promoting preemptive voting. Index fund providers
already cast their votes largely according to generic voting guidelines that are
formulated without reference to individual contexts and may be shaped in
advance of proxy solicitations. Additionally, steps could be taken to mitigate
concerns about reliance upon generic or pre-formulated voting guidelines,
including opting to have index fund investors select representation by other
agents who would have the ability to investigate firm-specific issues more
thoroughly, permitting index fund investors to update their preferences or
survey data at any point, requesting surveys be updated once annually, and
allowing investors to designate authority for index fund managers to override

255. Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management
Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8188, Exchange Act Release No. 47,304, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,922, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564, 6565 (Jan. 31, 2003) (“Because a
mutual fund is the beneficial owner of its portfolio securities, the fund’s board of directors, acting
on the fund’s behalf, has the right and the obligation to vote proxies relating to the fund’s portfolio
securities.”).
256. Id.
257. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 182, at 1276 (noting that “participation in a proxy solicitation triggers burdensome federal disclosure obligations”).
258. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(d)(2)–(3).
259. See Fisch, supra note 149, at 43.
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preferences recorded in a survey when firm-specific considerations support
doing so. In these ways, it is possible that seeking index fund investors’ input
on voting decisions could be structured in such a way as to involve regular
input from these investors or to permit some consideration of firm-specific
issues.
A third potential legal impediment would be any laws or regulations
imposing duties on shareholders to cast their votes in an informed manner.
Once again, such regulations would not apply to index fund investors, since
they are not shareholders in portfolio companies but rather shareholders of
the index fund itself. If anything, action by index fund providers to better
understand the interests, perspectives, and priorities of their shareholders
would likely result in more informed voting that enables index fund providers
to better fulfill their fiduciary duties to vote shares in the best interests of
index fund investors. 260 Moreover, neither state law 261 nor federal law predicate voting rights on being duly informed. 262 Thus, even if investor involvement in shaping voting decisions would be based upon uninformed thinking,
there are no clear legal requirements for informed voting and no prohibitions
on non-voting indirect investors engaging in an informed expression of their
interests and values.
5. A Choice Between Fractured Power and a Unified Voice
Fifth, deferring to shareholders raises an important question for how
those votes would be carried out. To the extent that shareholders express
different and opposite preferences (whether directly or indirectly), index fund
fiduciaries would be charged with voting on behalf of conflicting parties.
These fiduciaries would then need to either vote a proportional number of
shares in favor of each opposite position or to vote all shares according to the
most popular position.
The former (proportional) approach would diminish the power of index
funds, since their power would be fractured in support of two different and
opposite ends. However, to the extent that the concentration of power in the
hands of index funds is a problem, limiting this power is advantageous. Additionally, dividing votes between priorities would ensure that these votes
were cast in proportion to a given proposals’ actual support, making it more
likely that the outcome with the greatest support actually comes to fruition
once all votes are tabulated. The proportional approach may also complicate
engagements, since it would likely be more difficult to exert indirect pressure
260. Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management
Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8188, Exchange Act Release No. 47,304, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,922, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564.
261. See Fisch, supra note 149, at 47.
262. Id. at 49 (“Federal law does not actually require, however, that shareholders be informed.”).
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towards opposing ends. Again, this may be a positive consequence, particularly if these engagements give undue influence to index funds or reduce
transparency and accountability.
The latter (winner-take-all) approach would maintain index funds’
power and maximize their ability to leverage their influence via engagements. However, it would also mean that index fund agents would be demonstrably pursuing ends antithetical to the express interests and wishes of
many of their principals, an outcome in tension with the principles of agency
law and fiduciary relationships generally. Of course, it is extremely likely
that index funds already utilize their votes in a way that is inconsistent with
the preferences and interests of some of their clients; these preferences are
just unknown and therefore much easier to ignore or dismiss. In this way,
aligning the voting behaviors with the preferences of even a majority of investors would be an improvement on the status quo.
Ultimately, it would be preferable for index funds to wield their votes
proportionally to the preferences expressed by actual index fund investors to
the extent possible, as the advantages of maximum faithfulness to the interests of their investors appear to outweigh the costs in the form of diminished
influence (which, depending on one’s perspective, may actually be an added
benefit). Such an outcome is also more consistent with our notions of shareholder democracy, which generally feature voting in proportion to share ownership. 263
6. A Question of Method
Finally, there is the question of which of the above approaches to deferring to index fund investors ought to be the one utilized and who ought to
decide that matter. The best way to capture the true interests and values of
individual investors as they relate to corporate governance would be to take
a direct approach. By surveying their investors directly on key corporate
governance issues, rather than relying on indirect measures such as representation and inferences based on their general characteristics, index funds can
best understand and utilize the actual views of their investors. Such a course
of action would provide individual investors with the most direct avenue for
influencing corporate governance as well as the greatest check on index
funds’ power.
Alternatively, however, it would be possible to let individual index fund
investors decide for themselves through the market. If index fund providers
were to offer their investors a choice between different forms of involvement
263. See, e.g., Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law,
109 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1945 (1996) (“The one share, one vote principle is widely accepted across
jurisdictions. It is the dominant rule in the United States, Great Britain, and Japan even when it is
not a statutory requirement, and it is mandated by statute in many emerging market jurisdictions.”).
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(or if different index fund providers varied in the types of involvement they
offered), investors would be able to select whichever option they preferred,
whether that be selection of representation, provision of general data to be
used in guiding decisions, or direct input on key questions in corporate governance. In making their selection, these investors would be able to balance
the degree of control offered against the costs in the form of increased fees,
to the extent that there are any. In this way, it may not be necessary or even
desirable to select a single option; if the index fund industry pursues multiple
ways for individual investors to interact with index fund agents and their investment stewardship teams, this will provide maximum choice for investors
and allow investors to select the option that best fits their needs.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The proposals set forth in this Article start from the basic premise that
shareholder democracy should be democratic—that is, it should be controlled
by the individual human investors who make up its constituents. As it currently stands, the shareholder franchise does not extend to individual human
investors if they invested indirectly through certain intermediaries, including
index funds. When index fund investing was relatively rare, the fact that
these individuals did not retain voting power was essentially irrelevant, since
their degree of influence was so small that it was unlikely to impact voting
outcomes. Now that index fund providers have the power to shape the behaviors of nearly all publicly traded companies in the United States, however,
the contrast between notions of a true democracy and the status quo where a
handful of index fund agents wield virtually all of index funds’ power is exceedingly stark.
This Article seeks to promote a version of index fund voting that better
approximates a true democracy by involving individual human investors in
the voting process. It argues that such a course of action would ensure that
corporate decisionmaking was better aligned with individual human investors’ interests and values. Further, the proposed changes would also mitigate
several problems with index funds’ increasing dominance by decreasing concentration of power, increasing the heterogeneity in voting by index fund
providers, improving incentives for good stewardship, reuniting ownership
with ownership, reducing agency costs, and ensuring that index funds are not
passive in their approach to corporate governance. Moreover, the proposals
herein accomplish the same goals as other competing proposals while avoiding their potentially drastic consequences, such as destroying the fundamental business model of index funds via heavy-handed antitrust solutions or totally disenfranchising the holders of what will soon be the majority of all
equity assets.
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These proposals also serve as an important step to transcend rational
apathy for individual investors. Individual investors have long been uninvolved in corporate decisionmaking because of their relatively small stake in
a given company and the large and burdensome task of engaging with individual ballot items at individual portfolio companies. By greatly simplifying
and concentrating these tasks, this proposal utilizes the existing infrastructure
at index fund providers to transform individual investors’ rational apathy into
rational involvement. Given the current state of such infrastructure and other
digital technology, there is no reason that institutional investors should be
able to rely upon services and tools that allow them to aggregate and automate voting decisions while individual investors themselves are deprived of
such tools. Such changes would add much-needed legitimacy to the shareholder franchise, the foundation of all other corporate governance, and they
would provide a voice to the actual human investors for whom the whole
system is supposed to be working.

